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was obliged to retreat in the face of a determined Confederate force approaching him. 
The Camden Expedition, as this became known, has typically been cast as an expedition 
that failed due to a severe shortage of available food along the line of march. Upon 
closer investigation, however, particularly in the records of common soldiers, a different 
explanation emerges. For most of the campaign, forage was easily obtained, and no 
unusual lack of food for the men appeared until the very end of the campaign, during the 
last days of the retreat back to Little Rock. Instead, the causes of the expedition's failure 
must be assigned to Steele himself. Beset with political problems within the army and 
Arkansas politics, he was reluctant to leave Little Rock. He failed to plan adequately for 
the campaign's logistical needs, particularly for a potential permanent occupation of 
Camden. Finally, his policies towards Arkansas civilians combined with a very 
conservative attitude towards logistics to make Steele unwilling to exploit fully the 
resources he had available. This thesis discusses Steele's decisions on the Camden 
Expedition and places them in the context of his civilian policy, difficulties within the 
army, and his experience the year before on the campaign to capture Little Rock. 
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Both the Red River Campaign and Steele's supporting movement, known as the 
Camden Expedition, failed to achieve any of their objectives and only narrowly escaped 
total catastrophe. The reasons for their failure have been debated down to the present. 
The Camden Expedition is usually treated as an adjunct of the Red River Campaign. 
However, it was also a separate episode, which one can investigate in the context of the 
wider Arkansas situation and Steele's particular decisions and priorities. It shall, for the 
most part, be so considered here. 
While the Camden Expedition's failure most likely did not measurably improve 
the Confederacy's chances for final victory, and a major Union triumph would have 
done little to hasten the Confederacy's downfall, it, along with the Little Rock 
Campaign and Steele's subsequent occupation policy, does hold important insights for 
understanding the war. 
First, the occupation of Arkansas provides a look at the nature and progress of 
Union civilian policy in one part of the Confederacy. Steele followed a so-called 
"Conciliatory Policy," considered too soft by some but generally supported in 
Washington. Advancing this policy affected Steele's other priorities, military and 
otherwise, in myriad ways. The Camden Expedition provides an especially intriguing 
look at how military and occupation policy interacted and clashed, sometimes violently. 
Second, the military aspects of the Little Rock Campaign and Camden 
Expedition also provide interesting insights into logistics. Operational logistics during 
the Civil War has been little-studied, but is of signal importance nonetheless. These two 
campaigns featured disparate challenges and opportunities, often different from those 
further east. The railroad, for example, played no role in the operational supply of either 
2 
campaign. Furthermore, while wartime reports, as well as the modem secondary 
literature, contend that supply shortages led to the failure of the Camden Expedition, this 
explanation is inadequate. 
Third, Steele's experiences in Arkansas reveal several conflicts within the Union 
high command, and different perceptions of the campaign between the high command 
and the common soldiers. The squabbles between Steele and Brigadier General John 
Davidson, a "radical" who opposed much of Steele's civilian policy, illuminate much of 
the controversy over the Conciliatory Policy, and had complicated the later Camden 
Expedition. 
The contrast between the officers and soldiers came out most clearly during, and 
immediately after, the Camden Expedition. In a curious inversion of the well-known 
stereotype, the officers were unusually worried about the state of supplies for their men. 
The soldiers, in most cases, felt that their situation was, while not perfect, certainly 
acceptable and laid the blame for the defeat at Steele's feet, not on a poor forage 
situation. 
Finally, the Camden Expedition's aims have been misunderstood, sometimes 
even by the participants themselves. The planning phase of the expedition was a 
confused affair. Steele corresponded with several generals among the larger Union high 
command, who gave Steele few direct, clear instructions, but numerous broad 
authorizations and suggestions. This thesis argues that this gave Steele just enough 
cover to set out on a campaign designed to give only halfhearted support to Banks on the 
Red River. Furthermore, the objective of the campaign changed halfway through. 
Steele found himself holding the great prize of Camden, strongly fortified and well 
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situated on the Ouachita River. His decision to hold Camden changed the character of 
the expedition, and the expedition's logistical needs. 
The focus here is on the Camden Expedition, the largest and most-studied aspect 
of Steele's tenure in Arkansas. This thesis places it in the context of Union policy in 
Arkansas, and how that was expressed militarily from the moment Steele took 
command. When discussing military operations, the focus is on logistics: the support of 
the armies, particularly in food and fodder, the supposed Achilles' heel of the Camden 
Expedition. Besides the Official Records, a collection of numerous official reports and 
correspondence from the war, this work relies upon a wide range of other primary 
material from soldiers and officers alike, particularly archival sources that have been 
rarely used by scholars of these campaigns. 
This thesis begins with a review of the secondary literature from the past fifty 
years. This section points out the trends in recent scholarship, along with the 
historiography's weaknesses, particularly in historians' choice and use of primary 
sources. What follows is largely a narrative of events in Frederick Steele's command 
( civilian and military) from Helena through Camden. Again, the focus is not on battles 
but on politics, logistics, and the problems of command. The thesis closes with a brief 
narrative of the Camden Expedition's aftermath. After the campaign, Steele took pains 
to keep his reputation, command, and the Conciliatory Policy intact in the wake of news 
of the disaster. 
Despite being relatively unknown, in a less-than-glamorous theater of the war, 
and overshadowed by larger events, the Camden Expedition and its context deserve 
study for the sake of understanding the political and logistical limitations that can affect 
4 
campaigns. Furthermore, previous treatments of the subject have leaned far too heavily 
on the Official Records, which has presented a limited and one-sided view of the 
conflict. This thesis seeks to establish a larger context for the Camden Expedition 
within Arkansas, and bring the experiences of common soldiers closer to the front of the 
stage. 
5 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the Camden Expedition has not been blessed with anything approaching 
the scholarly attention given to Gettysburg, it has attracted a smattering of studies over 
the years, typically as a part oflarger projects, studying either Civil War-era Arkansas or 
the wider Red River campaign. One part of the Camden expedition, the notorious 
Poison Spring massacre of surrendering African-American troops, has received its own 
share of attention; however, as this event will not be treated in detail here, the fine works 
that have appeared on that subject will go without comment. 
The best-known work on the Red River campaign, Ludwell Johnson's Red River 
Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War, has been the preeminent work on the 
subject since its publication in 1958. Along with illuminating a relatively little-known 
campaign in the Trans-Mississippi theater, Johnson argued that "the Red River 
expedition should help to illustrate the fact that the campaigns of the Civil War often 
sprang from a complex set of circumstances sometimes wholly nonmilitary in nature." 
The most prominent nonmilitary consideration, according to Johnson, was cotton. The 
Confederate government owned a great deal of cotton in the region, and capturing it and 
delivering it to Massachusetts mills, at a tidy profit to the United States government, was 
a major impetus to the campaign. 1 
The Camden expedition receives one full chapter in Red River Campaign, and 
brief mention elsewhere. It is interesting that, whereas Johnson treats the political and 
nonmilitary motivations of Banks and the other major figures in the Red River campaign 
in depth, he largely passes over those of Steele. Johnson dispatches Steele's objections 
1 Ludwell Johnson, Red River Campaign: Politics and Cotton in the Civil War 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), i, 47. 
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to the campaign in a single paragraph. Johnson quotes Steele's protests that he had 
elections to supervise in Arkansas, and that he feared many of his soldiers would not 
return from furlough because "matters in the Army are influenced so much by political 
intrigue, it is not certain that these troops will return to my command."2 Johnson leaves 
this astonishing statement to speak for itself, without mentioning the conflict between 
Steele and Davidson, let alone how it reached a point where Steele feared that he would 
permanently lose his men because of it. Johnson rests most of his argument, however, 
on Steele's assertion that his command lacked the logistical support necessary to launch 
more than a demonstration to the south. 
Johnson entitled his chapter focusing on Camden "The Federals Go Hungry in 
Arkansas," which sets the tone for the chapter. Johnson lists a number of challenges 
facing Steele in southwest Arkansas: "At that time of year the roads were sloughs, the 
country was swept bare as a desert of all food and forage, and guerillas were active and 
numerous on a scale unknown east of the Mississippi." It would be hardly possible to 
suggest a direr situation. Despite these claims of the region' s destitution, Johnson does 
cite several instances of successful foraging. Indeed, he describes the region around 
Arkadelphia as "luxuriant," which inspired the troops to forage, with significant, if not 
entirely by the book, success.3 
Johnson closed the chapter with a summary ofreasons for the campaign's 
failure: 
The one major cause of Steele's failure was his lack of supplies. This 
sprang from (1) the poverty of the country through which he marched and (2) the 
insecurity of his lines of supply from the Arkansas River. If he had been entirely 
2 Ibid., 85. 
3 Ibid., 170, 1 72. 
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unopposed by hostile troops, Steele could have reached Shreveport, although his 
army would probably have been very hungry when it got there. But with a 
strong active enemy to impede his march, the task was impossible. Since Steele 
opposed the campaign from the first, and undertook it only as a direct order from 
Grant, he cannot be held responsible. He must, however, be held responsible for 
the loss of his trains .... On the other hand, Steele had to his credit the slow but 
well-conducted march from Little Rock and the successful rear-guard action at 
Jenkins' Ferry.4 
This passage is odd in a couple ofrespects. That Johnson's own sources 
sometimes contradict the notion of southwest Arkansas's "desert" qualities has already 
been mentioned. Johnson, earlier in the chapter, describes the column's ability to reach 
Shreveport in somewhat brighter terms, stating that Steele set out with "rations sufficient 
to have lasted to Shreveport, had the march been more rapid."5 Johnson's later praise 
for Steele's "slow ... march from Little Rock" seems out-of-place, as the very slowness 
of the march contributed to its dovmfall. Johnson's light treatment of Steele also seems 
unusual; many generals in history would probably have liked to be absolved of all blame 
for their poor decisions on campaign by claiming that the campaign was someone else's 
idea. This would seem to be a poor choice for a military historian, however, whose job 
is to analyze the decisions in and of themselves. 
Johnson leans heavily on two sources for his account of the Camden expedition, 
the Official Records and A. F. Sperry's History of the 33d Iowa Infantry Volunteer 
Regiment, a memoir first published in 1866. These are both excellent sources, and they 
will appear frequently in the notes of this thesis. Relying on just these two, however, 
limits the perspective of the campaign considerably. The Official Records present only 
the views of Steele and the high command. Sperry's work gives a view from the ranks, 
4 Ibid., 204. 
5 Ibid., 176. 
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but the way Johnson uses it limits its power. The view from below, in this account and 
others, often contradicts the story from the Official Records, but viewed in isolation this 
contradiction can be minimized. Johnson does this whenever evidence arose that the 
campaign theater was something other than a muddy desert; when Sperry reported that 
his regiment was able to forage for most of the campaign, Johnson treats their 
experience as an aberration. 
A more recent treatment of the Red River Campaign is Gary Dillard Joiner's One 
Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The Red River Campaign of 1864, published in 
2003. While in general this work benefits from a broader range of primary sources than 
Johnson had available forty-five years earlier, Joiner wrote the chapter on Steele and 
Camden using essentially the same material: the Official Records and 33d Iowa. The 
rhetoric, however, is substantially more moderate; rather than a "desert," Joiner 
describes central Arkansas as merely "barren." There is the occasional, odd 
contradiction, as well; first Steele's march from Little Rock to Arkadelphia was 
described as being "at a leisurely pace"; then on the next page Joiner writes, "Steele had 
made excellent time reaching Arkadelphia." As Joiner used predominately the same 
sources as Johnson, the narratives are unsurprisingly similar, and adduce the same basic 
causes for the expedition's failure. 6 
Perhaps the best example of placing the Camden expedition in the context of 
Civil War Arkansas is Rugged and Sublime: The Civil War in Arkansas, edited by Mark 
Christ and published in 1994. Each chapter, written by a different historian, narrates one 
year of the war. Daniel E. Sutherland wrote the 1864 chapter, which features the 
6 Gary Dillard Joiner, One Damn Blunder from Beginning to End: The Red River 
Campaign of 1864 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 123-125. 
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Camden Expedition. Sutherland drew on a far wider array of primary and secondary 
sources than had his predecessors, and the result is a narrative more in line with social, 
"new military history." Still, the majority of his primary sources came from published 
material (which has, over the years, grown substantially) rather than archival sources. 
Sutherland concludes that "Steele's most serious errors .. . were logistical. He did not 
anticipate the problems he would have in provisioning and supplying his men, and he 
lost far too many wagons and too much livestock."7 That Steele lost "far too many 
wagons" is incontestable; that he "failed to anticipate" his logistical difficulties is a more 
interesting assertion. In fact, logistical problems were a major preoccupation during the 
expedition's planning phase, and he could hardly have underestimated them given his 
portents of disaster. It would be more reasonable to assert that Steele prepared for these 
problems improperly, but Sutherland does not elaborate. 
There have been a few works on the Camden Expedition itself; alongside two 
published works is a pair of master' s theses. The first, in 1958, was "The Camden 
Expedition, March 23 - May 3, 1864" by Ira Don Richards. 8 While it is certainly useful 
to write the first scholarly treatment of any campaign, this particular thesis's near-total 
reliance on the Official Records as a primary source weakens it considerably. The 
second thesis, written by Mike Fisher in 1975, is "The Camden Expedition." This is a 
much fuller, and longer, treatment, featuring a much wider range of primary and 
secondary sources, taking advantage of the work done in the intervening seventeen 
years. Still, Fisher consulted few archival sources, and thus the lower ranks were 
7 Mark Christ, ed., Rugged and Sublime: The Civil War in Arkansas (Fayetteville: The 
University of Arkansas Press, 1994), 123. 
8 Ira Don Richards, "The Camden Expedition, March 23 - May 3, 1864 (M. A. Thesis, 
University of Arkansas, 1958). 
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represented largely by 33d Iowa, and the Official Records provided the bulk of the rest of 
the primary source material. It is a readable and lively narrative, but in terms of 
explaining the failure and context of this expedition it essentially repeats the same story 
it inherited from Ludwell Johnson: too few supplies, and an unlikely plan in the first 
place. Fisher did, however, find greater fault with the expedition's cavalry arm, which 
was weakened by a poor forage situation. In the chapter dealing with the run-up to the 
expedition, Fisher describes the civil and political situation in Little Rock as "complex," 
but does not elaborate. His work is predominately a traditional military narrative, and 
while it is a fine example of its type it would have benefited from a fuller treatment of 
the expedition's political and military context. 9 
If there is a "classic" treatment of Camden, it is Steele's Retreat from Camden 
and the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry by the prolific Edwin Bearss, which appeared in 1967. 
It was virtually a commission piece. In 1961, an amateur Arkansas historian asked 
Bearss, as a research historian at the Vicksburg National Military Park, if the park's 
archives held anything about Jenkins' Ferry. Bearss "explained that they did not, but I 
would be delighted to undertake a field study and prepare a report of the battle." 10 As 
the genesis of the project, and the title of the book itself, indicates, this slim volume 
focuses on the major battles taking up the second half of the campaign, from Poison 
Spring (which actually was before Steele's retreat began) through the return to Little 
Rock. However, far and away the gravest fault with Bearss's work is that he plagiarized 
9 Mike Fisher, "The Camden Expedition" (M.A. Thesis, Kansas State College of 
Pittsburg, 1975), 14, 170-171. 
10 Edwin Bearss, Steele 's Retreat from Camden and the Battle of Jenkins' Ferry (Little 
Rock: Arkansas Civil War Centennial Commission and Pioneer Press, 1967), "Notes 
from the Author" (inside front cover). 
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extensively from Johnson's "The Federals Go Hungry" chapter, particularly in its 
conclusions. 11 
In 2003, a new entrant in the field of Camden studies appeared: Michael 
Forsyth's The Camden Expedition of 1864 and the Opportunity Lost by the Confederacy 
to Change the Civil War. It is notable for being the first study of the campaign to use 
the Steele papers at Stanford University; it is also notable for being the first to claim that 
the campaign was critical to the Union war effort, and that if it had not been conducted 
the war might have been lost. 12 The armies under Steele and Banks had, after all, not 
been utterly destroyed, but, if they had been, the Confederacy would have been supreme 
in the Trans-Mississippi. This bit of what-if argument stretches credulity, in the first 
place, and furthermore moves the goalposts of "critical to Union success" to a 
remarkable degree. Burnside, after all, did not have his army entirely destroyed on 
Marye's Heights at Fredericksburg; by avoiding complete annihilation did Burnside, 
then, help ensure Union victory? 
All these works share certain drawbacks. For the most part, they use few sources 
from common soldiers, producing narratives based primarily on the Official Records and 
the testimony of Steele and other prominent officers. This has led to an uncritical 
acceptance of Steele's claim that he was in dire logistical straits; the view from below is 
rather more nuanced. Furthermore, these works typically pass over the political and 
11 Compare Bearss, Steele's Retreat, 177-179 (beginning "Despite the disappointing 
climax at Jenkins' Ferry, the Confederate campaign against General Steele had been on 
the whole a successful one .... ") with Johnson, Red River Campaign, 203-205 
(beginning "Despite this disappointing climax, the campaign against Steele had been on 
the whole a successful one .... "). Other examples exist, but this is the most extensive 
case of borrowing. 
12 Michael Forsyth, The Camden Expedition of 1864 and the Opportunity Lost by the 
Confederacy to Change the Civil War (Jefferson, N. C.: McFarland & Co., 2003), 3. 
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interpersonal problems Steele faced before Camden, and thus their impact on the 
expedition itself is largely unexplored. Even Rugged and Sublime, which focused on the 
war in Arkansas, largely passed over the interplay between the civilian and military 
spheres. 
This thesis attempts to provide this context: both the experience of the common 
soldier, and how Steele's experiences and problems before he left Little Rock helped 
shape the planning and execution of the Camden Expedition. By so doing, it brings out 
new complexities in the expedition. 
13 
FROM HELENA TO THE ROCK 
Frederick Steele was born in 1819, in New York. He graduated from West Point 
in 1843, a classmate of Ulysses S. Grant. His older brother, John B. Steele, was a 
Congressional representative from New York during the Civil War and would play an 
important role in his younger brother's military career. Both were war Democrats. 
Frederick Steele was as an officer in the Regulars before the war and upon the onset of 
hostilities was a major at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served in the Western and 
Trans-Mississippi Theaters throughout the Civil War. He commanded a battalion at 
Wilson's Creek, Missouri, and was promoted to major general in the spring of 1863. He 
commanded a division during the Vicksburg campaign. He was no stranger to 
Arkansas; in 1862 he served under Major General Samuel R. Curtis in northern and 
eastern Arkansas, and in 1863 was at the Battle of Arkansas Post. 1 
Originally, Major General Benjamin M. Prentiss was the assigned commander of 
the campaign against Little Rock. As late as July 30, Major General Stephen A. 
Hurlbut, commanding the XVI Corps from Memphis, wrote to Prentiss with precisely 
the same orders Steele was to receive. However, at the last moment word came from 
Grant that Steele, Grant's old classmate and subordinate during the Vicksburg 
campaign, was to command. On July 31, Frederick Steele took command at Helena of 
the Arkansas Expedition, as the forces assigned to capture Little Rock were known.2 
Grant and Hurlbut ordered Steele to attack Major General Sterling Price, in conjunction 
with General John Wynn Davidson's cavalry division, and to capture Little Rock. 
1 The best printed source on Steele remains Ezra J. Warner's Generals in Blue (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 474. 
2 A map of, and order of battle for the Union forces engaged in, the Little Rock 
Campaign can be found in the Appendix, 77-79. 
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Before leaving, however, Steele had to assemble his men. The greatest obstacle 
Steele faced in doing so was disease. By the time Steele arrived, Helena had been a 
Union-occupied outpost on the Mississippi for just over a year. The Union garrison had 
withstood periodic Confederate attacks, but faced its gravest threats from epidemic 
illnesses. Malaria, dysentery, and typhus were endemic, claiming many lives and 
incapacitating many they did not kill. 3 
By the time Steele took command, many soldiers doubtless relished the idea of 
leaving Helena for anywhere. Charles Musser, of the 29th Iowa, camped in Helena from 
the middle of April. He wrote to his parents just two weeks after his arrival that he 
feared "we are doomed to Stay at this miserable town of graves and Sutler Shops all 
Summer. i would rather run the risk of one battle than Stay here through the hot months 
of august and september." Three weeks later, on May eighth, he wrote of the death.of 
Sergeant Burroughs: "he died of the Camp Dysentery. he was worn down to a mere 
skeleton. he looked very bad for some time back. if he had been sent up the river one 
month ago, he would have got well ... there are too many that go the Same way, to the 
Shame of the army Surgeons." Disease would dog the column all the way to Little 
Rock. 4 
Steele had little time to waste, as Davidson's cavalry was already underway, 
moving from Pilot Knob through Jacksonport. From Memphis, Hurlbut wrote Steele on 
July 31 with a brief overview of the logistical situation and plan: 
3 Rhonda M. Kohl, '"This Godforsaken Town': Death and Disease at Helena, Arkansas, 
1862-63," Civil War History 50 (June 2004): 109-144. 
4 Charles 0. Musser, Soldier Boy: The Civil War Letters of Charles 0. Musser, 29th 
Iowa, ed. Barry Popchock (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1995), 49-50. 
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Davidson is about to move for Clarendon, on White River, a point easily 
accessible by boats at present stage of water. This should be the point of 
rendezvous for the entire force, and the temporary depot of supplies. If the 
Arkansas is in navigable stage, another point as high up as you can arrive with 
boats should be selected as a future depot. These questions must be intrusted to 
you to determine from better local knowledge than I can have since the short 
period to which I have been assigned to this duty. I am informed that the country 
between Clarendon and Little Rock is one of extreme difficulty, principally for 
lack of water and the peculiarly flinty character of the surface rock. In this view, 
if a route nearer the Arkansas River ... exists, it would be advisable to follow it. 
Wagons to be used should be overhauled thoroughly, and horses and mules new 
and well shod. Nothing should be taken; baggage should be done without. If 
there is deficiency in supply trains, they can be furnished from this place 
[Memphis].5 
Hurlbut ordered Steele to travel light so that the 10,000 men marching on Little 
Rock would move across the dry territory between Clarendon and Little Rock as quickly 
as possible. 6 On August 5, Steele issued orders for the composition of the expedition. 
Despite Hurlbut's insistence on traveling light, Steele prescribed a very substantial 
supply train. Each regiment would have six wagons assigned to it: one for ammunition, 
five for transportation (four, if the regiment had fewer than four hundred men); batteries 
would have three wagons. Each regiment carried five days' rations, two days' worth 
being distributed to the men.7 The general supply train, carrying food and supplies for 
the entire command, would be vast. Steele's quartermasters would clean out virtually 
the entire wagon park of Helena, and two steam transports would move up the river. 
Sixty days' rations would be carried along in the general supply train; a very 
5 War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of 
the Union and Confederate Armies, 130 vols. (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1880-1901) 1st ser., vol. 22, pt. 2, 414-415. (Hereafter OR; all references are to 
the 1st series unless otherwise stated.) 
6 Ibid., 414. 
7 A day's marching ration for one soldier was "one pound of hard bread [hardtack], 
three-fourths of a pound of salt pork, or one and one-fourth pounds of fresh meat; sugar, 
coffee, and salt." John D. Billings, Hardtack and Coffee: The Unwritten Story of Army 
Life (1887; reprint, Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1993), 112. 
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conservative amount, considering that the Confederates were not expected to put up 
much resistance. 8 Why Steele settled on such a large train, with so much food, is 
unclear, as no records on the subject survive. Steele had enough equipment to be very 
cautious logistically, and likely decided to simply eliminate any possibility of running 
low on supplies. He would display a similar aversion to risk later, before leaving on the 
Camden Expedition. 
The bustle of a camp preparing to leave on campaign did not escape the notice of 
the men, of course. On August 5, Musser wrote home that his regiment began "making 
preparation for a long march across the country to Little Rock. it is Said a very large 
provision train is being fitted out." He reported that yet more wagons were being 
unloaded at the docks, and that the sick call was growing ever longer. 9 
The wagons that made up supply trains carried a vast array of the materiel and 
impedimenta of war. A standard US Army wagon, hauled by six mules, could carry 
approximately a two-ton load under ideal conditions-a flat, paved road. Under less 
than ideal conditions, such as Arkansas, one could expect a wagon to draw 
approximately one ton, perhaps slightly more. Some of that load, however, was 
reserved for food for the draft animals themselves. Grazing, particularly while on 
campaign, was impractical; it required an enormous amount of land and time. 
Regulations stipulated that each mule should have fourteen pounds of fodder and nine 
pounds of grain per day; on campaign, this was typically too little, and many animals 
broke down along the way. Generally, a wagon would carry two days' worth of animal 
fodder and grain (270 lbs.) along with its normal load of the supplies for the army: food 
80R, vol. 22, pt. 2, 433 . 
9 Musser, Soldier Boy, 75. 
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for the men, camp equipment, ammunition, baggage of officers and men would all be 
carried along. 1° Furthermore, empty wagons would be brought along for foraging 
parties, in order to bring in the fruits of their labors. A wagon train, therefore, was an 
extensive operation, and occupied a proportional amount of space on the march. A six-
mule wagon would take up approximately forty feet of road space; add to this an interval 
that would lengthen and shorten with the necessities of the road. Seventy-five to ninety 
wagons, in single-file, could thus stretch out over a mile. 11 
By August 10, the expedition was ready to leave. Steele reviewed his troops, 
after which the men began to get ready to set off in the morning. Steele left Helena with 
some 6000 men, largely infantry, with four artillery batteries, to join Davidson, leading a 
further 6000, mostly cavalry. 12 The same day, Steele issued General Orders No. 5, 
establishing the order and conduct of the column. The Third Division, under Colonel 
Samuel A. Rice, would set out on the eleventh, going ahead of the rest of the army and 
"building such bridges and making such repairs on the road as may be necessary for the 
transportation of supplies, &c." The main supply train would also move with this 
advance party. Despite the lengthy train, soldiers were obliged to leave many of their 
belongings behind in Helena. Charles Musser registered a box with the quartermaster 
containing his "Overcoat Coat, dress coat, 1 pair pants, one shirt, 2 pair drawers, one 
blanket." 13 
10 John G. Moore. "Mobility and Strategy in the Civil War," Military Affairs 24 
(Summer 1960): 71 (note 7). 
11 The classic account of the nature of wagon trains is in Billings, Hardtack and Coffee, 
350-376. 
12 OR, vol. 22, pt. 1, 475. 
13 Musser, Soldier Boy, 77. 
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Already, Steele connected logistics to his political goals. Part VI of Order No. 5 
dealt with foraging and discipline, and their political ramifications: 
No property will be taken from citizens without authority. Foraging 
parties will be organized by brigade commanders and placed in charge of 
commissioned officers, for the purpose of obtaining necessary supplies. 
Straggling, marauding, and setting buildings on fire positively forbidden. Any 
infraction of this order that may be detected will be summarily punished, and any 
officer who shall fail to notice such infraction shall be deemed guilty of neglect 
of duty and dealt with accordingly. These measures are necessary for the sake of 
discipline, and as a matter of policy toward the people of Arkansas, whom we 
desire to bring back to their allegiance. The general commanding sincerely 
hopes that for the credit of the command and the reputation of the government 
which we represent, both officers and men will view this in a proper light. 14 
This is the first explicit mention during the campaign of a desire to encourage unionist 
sentiment among the Arkansan population through military policy. It was certainly 
consistent with President Abraham Lincoln's well-known and longstanding aim to 
encourage unionism in the Confederacy, and it would shape Steele's civilian and 
military policies for the rest of his tenure in Arkansas . 
By the tenth, Davidson had already reached Clarendon, establishing a camp and 
awaiting Steele's arrival. Davidson's cavalrymen, marching through northeastern 
Arkansas, found the forage relatively easy; Albert Demuth, of the 8th Missouri Cavalry, 
waxed lyrical about the Arkansas countryside and its bounty for the enterprising soldier: 
It is all a mistake about the people of the South starving this next season for they 
have more than you have in Missouri. Such cornfields I have never seen since I 
was born. Every farm we pass has thousands of bushels planted, and such com. 
I thought the Prairies of the North was the place to grow com but these swamp 
lands of the Arkansas beats it so bad that it is of no account at all hardly. Why it 
grows so high that I could not reach the top ear standing on a flour barrel, and 
three or four stalks on a hill. 15 
14 OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, 442. 
15 Albert Demuth, The Civil War Letters of Albert Demuth, and Roster Eighth Missouri 
Volunteer Cavalry (Springfield, Mo.: Greene County Historical Society, 1997), 27-28. 
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Robert McMahan, an Ohio artilleryman with Davidson's division, was less lyrical but 
still found the going to be generally easy. On July 28, he wrote that the "crops of com, 
cotton, & sweet potatoes look excellent"; on August 2, he found the same 
extraordinarily large com that Demuth reported. By the 6, however, the corn he found 
had dwindled; "what few ears there were, were so small that we could barely call them 
roasting ears." 16 
Despite this considerable forage, however, Davidson's division still required 
frequent supplies of rations. Several times during their march, boats from the 
Mississippi or trains from Helena made their way up to Davidson's men, bringing 
rations. Davidson, who would later be a Radical thorn in the side of the conservative 
Steele in Little Rock, had something of a reputation among his men for being soft on the 
presumed rebels that lined the path of the march. Demuth was unimpressed by his 
General. "If we were commanded by a Blunt, a Herron, or a Hooker," he wrote, "this 
division would carve a name in the annals of our Nation's glorious victories that nothing 
human could approach." Demuth wrote that nine miles from Clarendon, the 
Confederates had amassed twenty thousand bushels of com, which the Federals had 
been plundering for two days. "I suppose General Davidson will give them a receipt for 
it so they will not lose much," he wrote. "He gives the Secesh receipts for everything 
we take from them." 17 There is no evidence that Davidson was ordered to forage lightly, 
or treat the inhabitants with any extraordinary concern. Given his later severe criticism 
of Steele's "Conciliatory Policy" towards Arkansan planters, either in the following few 
16 Robert T. McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer: The Diary of Robert T McMahan of the 
Twenty-fifth Independent Ohio Light Artillery, ed. Michael E. Banasik (Iowa City: Camp 
Pope Bookshop, 2000), 169-174. 
17 Demuth, Civil War Letters, 28. 
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weeks Davidson had a major change in approach, or else Demuth misinterpreted his 
commander's actions. The latter would seem more probable. 
Davidson's cavalry waited for Steele's column for several days, the vanguard of 
which began arriving on the sixteenth, and Steele himself took command of the now-
united force on the seventeenth. In the meantime, Davidson's camp was not idle. Boats 
came up with supplies on the fourteenth, and foraging parties went out regularly to bring 
in food, forage, mules, and often took in escaped slaves along the way. McMahan wrote 
that on the twelfth, a large group of black women and children were escorted into camp 
by foragers. McMahan did not give any precise figures, but did point out that "forty or 
50" came from one nearby large plantation, and that Davidson established a contraband 
camp near divisional headquarters. 18 
Early on, the working relationship between generals Steele and Davidson 
appears to have been good. Davidson had been acting semi-independently before Steele 
was placed in command at Helena, and informing Davidson of what was going on with 
the larger operation was difficult. Davidson was, furthermore, impetuous and reining 
him in required some work. On August 4, he informed Major General Ulysses S. Grant 
that he could capture Little Rock himself if he could just be reinforced. However, 
instructions from Hurlbut clarifying Davidson's orders eventually reached him and, 
henceforth, Davidson and Steele cooperated fully. 19 
On August 16, as his command began to reach Clarendon, Steele wrote back to 
Hurlbut in Memphis. Forwarding a letter from Davidson, which reported on the 
disposition of the Confederate forces, Steele pleaded for reinforcements and heavy 
18 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 175. 
19 OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, 430, 442. 
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artillery. He thought that Price was being reinforced by Lieutenant General Edmund 
Kirby Smith from the southwest, and that already the enemy was "much stronger than 
ours now," and digging in. Without reinforcements, Steele predicted "a failure of the 
expedition." He reported logistical worries, as well, requesting 600 barrels of water. 20 
Water, indeed, was scarce along the route. Swamps and standing water, then as 
now, characterized the area between Helena and Clarendon. The heat, furthermore, was 
oppressive. Many of the units, such as the 33 rd Iowa Infantry, had never marched hard 
on campaign before and suffered even more. The combination of these three factors 
produced suffering for the men. A. F. Sperry recalled after the war, "The heat and hard 
marching together, were too much for any ordinary powers of endurance. Men would 
fall out of the ranks and tumble down at the side of the road, by dozens and almost by 
hundreds. "21 
The men from Helena marched into Clarendon over a few days, beginning on the 
sixteenth. There, disease, engendered at Helena and exacerbated by the heat and poor 
water, struck hard. Charles Musser wrote, "we have to leave a great many men here [at 
Clarendon] and a force to guard them. thirty of our regiment took sick since we left 
Helena. the complaint is swamp fever and the ague. We Camp on a low, flat bottom 
near a Swamp and use the river, which is very bad." Sperry wrote that "Clarendon was 
the very home and head-quarters of ague in bulk and quantity. The very air was thick 
20 Ibid., 454. 
21 A. F. Sperry, History of the 33d Iowa Infantry Volunteer Regiment 1863-6, ed. 
Gregory J.W. Urwin and Cathy Kunzinger Urwin (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas 
Press, 1999), 46. 
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with it. We could almost hew out blocks of it, and splash them into the river." Steele, 
writing back to Hurlbut in Memphis, reported "several hundred" sick.22 
The now-united command camped around Clarendon until the twenty-second, 
awaiting supplies and reinforcements. The water situation was still not good, but some 
units fared better than others. Robert McMahan's artillery unit, for example, was 
camped around a well of "excellent" water. Meanwhile, Steele had to consider his next 
move. In his letter of the eighteenth, he considered Devall's Bluff, another small town 
and the eastern terminus of the railroad out of Little Rock; this was clearly an important 
location, and Steele settled on this as his next objective.23 
Devall ' s Bluff was one day's march from Clarendon, and Steele's column 
reached it on the twenty-third, with some elements trickling in on the twenty-fourth. By 
this time, the health of his men had deteriorated even further. Steele wrote a dire letter to 
Hurlbut. "The sick list is frightful ," he wrote, with many senior officers beginning to 
fall ill. "This is the poorest command that I have ever seen," he continued, and again 
repeated that without reinforcements, the expedition would end in catastrophe. Devall's 
Bluff, however, proved to be a happier location than Clarendon. Sperry wrote that the 
region reminded the Iowans of home, with its "Iowa prairie, and an Iowa breeze blowing 
over it." George Flanders, of the Fifth Kansas Cavalry, was pleasantly reminded of 
Kansas, and declared it "the prettiest site I have seen in Ark."24 
The infantry remained in Devall's Bluff, recuperating, for a week while the 
cavalry scouted the routes to Little Rock and drove back elements of the Confederate 
22 Musser, Soldier Boy, 80; Sperry, 33d Iowa, 51; OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, 438. 
23 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 180; OR, vol. 22, pt. 2,458. 
24 OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, 468; Sperry, 33d Iowa, 52; Alice L. Fry, ed., Following the Fifth 
Kansas Cavalry: The Letters, (self-published, 1998), 186. 
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cavalry. On August 26, Steele wrote another report to Hurlbut. Boats had brought up 
the supplies, a hospital, and many men from Clarendon to the healthier air of Devall's 
Bluff, and the move had begun to pay off. In just three days, "the health of the 
command has improved perceptibly," thanks to having gotten out of the swamps and 
into a camp with a fast current on the river. Devall's Bluff held great promise as a 
supply depot. A gristmill and sawmill were two miles away. Lumber was not especially 
plentiful, but abandoned buildings were, and more lumber was obtained from 
dismantling a "large church where secession doctrines have been extensively 
promulgated." It was also a rich agricultural region, Steele wrote, with substantial 
supplies of com and beef nearby. 25 
The foraging opportunities in the area did not escape the attention of the soldiers, 
either, despite the stem admonitions of Steele's Order No. 5. Charles Musser wrote to 
his sister: 
when we Stop at a plantation, the poultry, pigs, and beef has to Suffer. Some of 
our boys just now passed here, driveing a fat Steer. they are taking him out of 
Sight of the officers to kill him .... when there is orders not to Shoot, we 
bayonette the hogs and beef, the bayonette is more used for such purpose than 
any other. 26 
Robert McMahan, for his part, ate "sweet potatoes and mutton" on the night of the 
twenty-fifth. 27 
By the thirty-first, Steele felt that his infantry was ready to move again. He 
mentioned, in his General Orders No. 13, that "all the means at hand will be used for 
carrying water on the march," but the marching from Devall's Bluff would, in many 
25 OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, 476. 
26 Musser, Soldier Boy, 82. 
27 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 182. 
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cases, be harder than the march to Clarendon.28 While previously the water was 
undrinkable, for much of the rest of the march it would be unavailable. The land was 
largely prairie. A. F. Sperry, writing after the war, gave a vivid picture of the thirst the 
men faced. "So we imagined we had already known what was meant by scarcity of 
water, but the worst was yet to come," describing a long march on September 1, he 
wrote: 
So scarce was the water now, that to prepare for that twenty-miles march in the 
heat of a Southern August, many of us had to fill our canteens from a puddle 
· where the hogs had wallowed, and in the bottom of which was a hard one .... 
Before the day was half gone, the "stragglers" ... might be counted almost by 
hundreds .... One hardly can imagine what thirst is until he has seen some such 
time as this, when he begins to have strange, waking dreams of water, and of the 
happiness of lying down, if only for a minute, on a green bank, and having a 
river run into his mouth. 29 
Steele wrote on September 1 about his own concerns. He reported a worsening 
situation in front of Little Rock, with reinforcements coming in from Kirby Smith, and 
the Confederates digging in amidst inhospitable terrain. Steele thought he was 
outnumbered, estimating Price's force at about 14,000; in fact, Price had around 8000 
men at his disposal. 30 
The particular military movements that ensued as the Union finally converged on 
Little Rock have been discussed in other works, and can be briefly summarized here. 
By August 27, the Confederates had fallen back to defend a perimeter five miles around 
Little Rock, and awaited the inevitable Union attack. The next several days were times 
of intense confusion in Price's camp. He was unable to rouse the citizens of Little Rock 
28 OR, vol. 22, pt. 2, 501. 
29 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 53. 
30 OR, vol. 22, pt. 1,474,521. In his report, Price estimated Steele's forces at around 
20,000. 
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to enlist as emergency defenders of the city. In addition, Confederate general John S. 
Marmaduke shot and killed his fellow general, Lucius M. Walker, in a duel on 
September 6, which threw the Confederate high command into turmoil. On the ninth, 
Davidson had crossed the Arkansas River downstream of Little Rock, and the two wings 
of the Union army converged on Little Rock. Davidson was temporarily halted just 
outside the city by Marmaduke's men, who inflicted few casualties but bought Price 
time to evacuate the city. Steele's men marched in on September 10. Steele's worries 
about a superior, well-fortified Confederate army proved to be unfounded, and Price was 
driven out of central Arkansas with extremely little fighting. 31 
Logistically speaking, once Steele's forces had crossed the prairies just west of 
Devall's Bluff, the march was in some sense "downhill." The weather remained hot, 
and there were still bayous to cross, but the major crises that plagued the campaign, 
disease and acute lack of water, had passed. Just before Little Rock, Sperry recalled that 
"grapes were quite plenty, from the small black frost grape to the rich and juicy 
muscadine .... [W]e marched along the side of a field containing one thousand acres of 
com, with a strip of sweet potatoes looking large enough to supply all our army while 
the season lasted."32 Indeed, Union soldiers often mention sweet potatoes, and they 
acquired the southern staple by fair means or foul during their tenure in Arkansas. 
Robert McMahan ate them on September 8, along with honey, pork, "and a small ration 
31 One excellent summary of the skirmishes and movements of the Little Rock 
campaign's final phases can be found in Thomas A. DeBlack, "1863: We Must Stand or 
Fall Alone," in Rugged and Sublime: The Civil War in Arkansas ed. Mark K. Christ 
(Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1994), 91-94. 
32 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 54. 
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of hard bread." The next morning, he had more sweet potatoes with his coffee and 
bacon.33 
The logistics of the Little Rock campaign was influenced by several factors. 
Geography and ecology played an important role. The army marched over varied 
terrain, from swamps in the east, across dry prairies, and finally the rich farmland near 
Little Rock. The poor water encountered over much of the march was exacerbated by 
intense late summer heat. A shortage of potable water was accompanied by a 
superfluity of food. Farms and animals were relatively common along the route, and 
pigs and sweet potatoes supplemented the rations Steele had brought along. He left 
Helena with sixty days' rations, for a march which lasted about half that. Furthermore, 
when the advance followed the local rivers, steamboats were able to transport 
reinforcements, the sick, and supplies with relative ease. In other locations, however, 
the path was lined by swamps and standing water unfit for human consumption. 
It is difficult to fault Steele for many decisions he made on this campaign; after 
all, he accomplished his objectives with extremely few losses. His logistical plan, taken 
as a whole, was quite successful. He made good use of his circumstances. He had 
substantial food stores at his disposal at Helena, and he was able to take along a long 
wagon train full of it thanks to the Confederates, who never posed a serious threat to his 
trains. He left Helena with an extremely sick command; marching overland with poor 
water and high heat only made things worse. The camps he established, however, were 
progressively better-situated, and with adequate periods of rest and recuperation his 
command grew healthier as it moved closer to Little Rock. His other major problem, 
33 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 193. 
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water, was solved through a combination of water supplies coming up the river and 
finding campsites with at least some wells. The end result was not enviable, but the 
command avoided crippling difficulties. 
Steele displayed two characteristics on this campaign, conducted in an 
atmosphere of enormous material resources and minimal enemy opposition, which 
would recur throughout his tenure in Arkansas. The first was his concern for Arkansas 
unionists, wherever they might be. He wanted the Union army to tread lightly, lest the 
planters and farmers flee back into the arms of the Confederacy. He prescribed severe 
penalties not just for soldiers foraging by the road, but officers who knew of the foraging 
and did nothing. None of the sources considered for this project mention a soldier or 
officer being punished, but the threat was at least strong enough to persuade Charles 
Musser' s comrades to butcher their captured steer in secret. 
The second trait Steele showed was caution. Price reported that he defended 
Little Rock with approximately 8000 men; far less than Steele had, but Steele still 
thought he was marching against a vast, heavily-fortified enemy host. 34 Steele called 
several times for reinforcements and more supplies. He took very few risks during the 
campaign, logistically speaking. He did not count on the countryside to provide forage, 
as evidenced by his sixty days' worth of rations . He tried to stay close to rivers when 
possible, so he could be easily resupplied if need be. But, this campaign did not require 
many risks; in later campaigns, Steele would not be so lucky. 
34 OR, vol. 22, pt. 1, 521. 
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THE LITTLE ROCK OCCUPATION 
With the capture of Little Rock, Steele's task of administering Arkansas, and 
shepherding it through reconstruction, began. Steele did not receive formal authority 
over all military and civilian policy until January 5, 1864, but he exercised de facto 
control from the moment he entered Little Rock. 1 Until the Camden Expedition, the . 
administration of Arkansas and the Federal forces therein were Steele's only concern. 
The most thorough account of this period is Benjamin Boulden's "So Long as Strangers 
are the Rulers: General Frederick Steele and the Politics of Wartime Reconstruction in 
Arkansas. "2 As the title suggests, Boulden focuses on the domestic politics of Arkansas 
and how Steele's policies affected them. These policies, however, also affected Steele's 
military plans. One of Steele's primary concerns, just as during the Little Rock 
Campaign, was to tread lightly on Arkansas's civilian population, particularly the more 
conservative prewar elites. These policies would prove highly controversial, and would 
encourage attacks on Steele ' s position and authority. 
Steele devised and implemented a plan for Arkansas reconstruction that he called 
the "Conciliatory Policy." Steele sought to bring Arkansas back into the Union with as 
little societal and political disruption as possible. This meant supporting the antebellum 
planter elite and keeping a lid on more radical factions, in the hope that the planters 
would change their allegiance if they saw the Federals meant them no harm. This 
motive underlay Steele's orders against foraging during the Little Rock campaign. As 
the administrator of Arkansas, Steele applied this policy on a grand scale. He sought to 
1 OR, vol. 32, pt. 2, 33. 
2 Benjamin Boulden, "So Long as Strangers are the Rulers: General Frederick Steele and 
the Politics of Wartime Reconstruction in Arkansas" (M. A. Thesis, University of 
Arkansas, 1992). 
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protect planter privilege just as he sought to protect planter property, and for much the 
same reason. His policies seemed to conform nicely to Lincoln's plan of "restoration," 
promulgated in December, 1863, which allowed a smooth transition back to statehood 
provided merely ten percent of the population swore future loyalty to the Union. 
However, Boulden argues persuasively that the real result of Steele's policy was to 
weaken unionism in Arkansas, not strengthen it.3 
At the beginning, there were indications that Unionism was strong in Little Rock, 
and thus reconstruction would progress easily. On September 22 Charles Musser wrote 
that, "the Citizens [of Little Rock] generaly Seemed glad to see us and treat us with 
great Kindess. there is Some very fine people in the city." Robert McMahan reported 
"quite a number" of loyal citizens in Little Rock, and heard a sermon from a pragmatic 
Methodist minister who "said he had his prejudices and who had not but he was willing 
to be subject to the 'powers that be ' and a good citizen." On September 20, Edward 
Rolfe wrote that Little Rock had "the Most union people here of any town that they have 
been in to yet and hundreds are coming in of the Citizens to take the Oath every day."4 
There was some support for the Conciliatory Policy among the ranks. Charles 
Musser, who would later be a strident critic of Steele, praised the policy and its effects in 
a letter home on January 1, 1864: 
The policy of Gen! Steele has won thousands [ of Rebels] back and has recruited 
the Federal army with thousands of good men ... . if he had adopted a policy 
Such as some rabid retaliators wished, men that would now wear the blue would 
3 Boulden, "So Long as Strangers are the Rulers," 17-43. 
4 Musser, Soldier Boy, 85; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 198; Edward Rolfe, A Civil 
War Union Soldier Describes his Army Life as Three Years of "Hard Marches, Hard 
Crackers, and Hard Beds, and Pickett Guard in a Desolate Country" (Prescott Valley, 
Ariz.: Lillibridge Publishing, 1993), 81. 
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then have been driven to desperation, and cursed the federal rule, and lay in 
ambush to revenge themselves.5 
One aspect of Steele's policy was to encourage contact between the army and the 
citizens. Indeed, several of the soldiers whose letters have survived report taking meals 
with the locals, but perhaps the most popular shared entertainment was horse racing. 
Robert McMahan, a great fan of the races, enjoyed a day at the track in late January and 
reported, "all enjoy the fun, citizens as well as soldiers."6 
The races, however, became one of the many points of conflict that arose 
between Steele and Davidson, his cavalry commander. Their good working relationship 
broke down during the occupation of Little Rock. Davidson was in command of the city 
of Little Rock itself, and thus the two generals frequently had overlapping, or clashing, 
spheres of influence. What precisely came between the two has been debated. 
Davidson had closer ties with the more radical Unionists in Little Rock, and differing 
politics doubtless explains some of the animosity. Davidson was also an ambitious man, 
and may have desired Steele's position for himself.7 
In December of 1863, Davidson wrote a letter to Missouri Congressman S. H. 
Boyd, introducing a certain Arkansan. The letter ended up published in the St. Louis 
Missouri Democrat, and thence found its way back to Steele. In the letter, Davidson 
blasted the Conciliatory Policy as useless. Davidson claimed that it was only longtime 
Union men coming out of hiding that were taking the oath, not repentant rebels 
impressed by Federal restraint. Steele, incensed, wrote a letter of his own to the 
Democrat denying the inefficacy of his policy and calling Davidson "an ungrateful 
5 Musser, Soldier Boy, l 02. 
6 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 216, 
7 Boulden, "So Long as Strangers are the Rulers," 35-7. 
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scoundrel."8 Steele had Davidson reassigned to an administrative post in St. Louis, and 
Davidson left Little Rock on February 11. 
Out of Little Rock, Davidson began a campaign against Steele and the 
Conciliatory Policy in real earnest. In a series of letters to Lincoln, General-in-Chief 
Henry W. Halleck, and the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, he accused 
Steele of hurting unionism and military readiness through his civilian policies. Notably, 
the Conciliatory Policy damaged the VII Corps' logistics. Davidson accused Steele of 
issuing protection papers to almost any Arkansan, unionist or not, for miles around Little 
Rock, requiring foraging parties to travel more than twenty miles outside the city. The 
cavalry division found it difficult to requisition horses, and the horses it did have were 
often sent to the racetrack, where they were exhausted. Davidson cited reports that 2500 
VII Corps horses died over the winter. Steele would keenly feel the lack of these horses 
in the spring, on the Camden Expedition.9 
Nothing came of Davidson' s exertions. Steele had the support of his West Point 
classmate Grant, of Lincoln, and Steele's brother in Congress. Davidson, furthermore, 
was possibly too strident for his own good, his rhetoric and determination tiring the 
authorities. Still, Steele began to worry more about his own position, and possible 
attacks from outside. 
In January of 1864, reports began to circulate, in Washington and Little Rock, 
that Major General Dan Sickles, then making a tour of the occupied south, would stop in 
Little Rock. Steele and native Arkansas conservatives were worried that this might lead 
8 United States Congress, Senate, Report on the Conduct of the War, 2nd Session, 38th 
Congress, Pt. 3, I 865-5, 38th Congress, 2nd Sess., Appendix, 83-4. 
9 Ibid., 78-86. 
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to a less hospitable regime. One Little Rock resident, G. P. Bertrand, wrote Lincoln to 
assure him that Steele had the "unlimited confidence" of Arkansans and that "Gen Steele 
needs no one to be sent here to keep things straight, either in the civil or military 
departments." Such testimonials came even after Lincoln had sent a telegram to Steele, 
assuring him that Sickles would not be "[meddling] in your affairs." As it turned out, 
Sickles did not visit Arkansas. 10 
A third threat appeared later in the spring, in the form of Major General James 
Blunt. Blunt was the great Radical hope in Arkansas, and had the support of many of 
the Kansans under Steele's command. Brigadier General John Thayer, commanding the 
District of the Frontier from Fort Smith, took his orders from Steele and would bear the 
brunt of Blunt's assault. Blunt arrived at Fort Smith in early March, and wrote to 
General Curtis, a close ally, on the ninth. He reported that the condition of the troops in 
Fort Smith, the major post in northwest Arkansas, was quite poor and required better 
leadership. "It would be an easy matter," he wrote, "for me to take command of all the 
troops heretofore belonging to the District of the Frontier, as officers and men are 
anxious for me to assume command of them, and they will cheerfully comply with 
whatever I may ask of them in defiance of Thayer and Steele." 11 The labyrinth of 
intrigue surrounding this incident, stretching for months, deserves a treatment beyond 
the scope of this work. Suffice to say that Blunt, and Curtis, worked hard to undermine 
Steele's authority in Fort Smith, despite repeated cautions from Washington that this 
was outside their proper territory. While Blunt was unable to entirely undermine 
10 G. P. Bertrand to Abraham Lincoln, Feb. 20, 1864, Frederick Steele Papers, microfilm 
edition, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville (hereafter cited as "Steele 
Papers"); Abraham Lincoln to Steele, Jan. 25, 1864, ibid. 
11 OR, vol. 34, pt. 2, 537. 
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Steele's authority, Blunt's popularity among some of the troops, particularly the 
Kansans, would cause further problems just as the Camden Expedition was to leave. 12 
During the first months of his occupation of Little Rock, then, Steele was beset 
by a great many problems, virtually all of them political. He was overseeing a 
controversial occupation policy and rebuilding civil government in Arkansas while 
facing threats to his authority and position from radical generals. Steele needed time to 
sort all this out and defend himself and his command. For Steele, a major military 
campaign could not have come at a worse time than in early spring, 1864. 
12 Robert Collins, General James G. Blunt: Tarnished Glory (Gretna, La.: Pelican, 
2005), 175-179. 
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PLANNING THE SPRING CAMPAIGNS 
The Red River Campaign was born out of political and economic considerations, 
rather than strictly military expediency. Mobile, Alabama, was a more logical military 
target for the forces in Louisiana. Shreveport and the Red River, however, commanded 
significant cotton-growing areas, useful for struggling New England mills. Furthermore, 
Lincoln and others in Washington feared that French-dominated Mexico, bordering 
Texas, might be the source of European intrigues in the war if the Union did not plant a 
secure force in the area. 1 
Steele's belief that only he understood the true situation in Arkansas came out 
strongly in the planning for the 1864 spring campaign. Steele was expected, from the 
earliest planning stages of the Red River Campaign, to cooperate with Nathaniel Banks. 
Steele, however, found one reason after another to explain why his assistance would be 
unnecessary, unwise, or impractical. On February 5, he described his difficulties in a 
letter to Banks. Steele said there were three possible routes from Little Rock to the Red 
River: via Pine Bluff, Camden, or Arkadelphia. Steele considered the Pine Bluff route 
more "practicable" than the other two, but it was blocked by the greatest number of 
Confederates. Furthermore, Steele had a number of units on furlough, and feared that 
they would not return because of "political intrigue" within the army, likely a reference 
to the troubles with Davidson and Blunt. Finally, Steele had intelligence that an attack 
on Pine Bluff, a tenuous Union outpost, could come at any moment. Still, Steele assured 
1 Gary Dillard Joiner, One Damn Blunder, 1-11 . 
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Banks that he would "be glad ... to cooperate with you in any of your movements, if 
possible" (emphasis added).2 
Soon, Banks and the other planners decided on March 5 as the date when Steele 
and Banks would set off. On February 28, Steele wrote that the fifth would be 
impossible. On March 14, a civil election was to take place, and Steele needed every 
man he had available to guard the polls against guerrillas. The rebels were growing in 
strength. Steele suggested that Banks, who was to receive troops from Major General 
William T. Sherman's Army of the Tennessee, go on without him. Steele would "make 
a demonstration" against Price, which would drive the Confederates into Texas, where 
Banks would mop them up. Sherman disagreed; he valued the military campaign more 
than the political campaigns, and urged Steele to "push straight for Shreveport with all 
he has."3 
Sherman wrote Steele on March 4 with further instructions, couched as 
suggestions from a "friend and brother officer." Sherman assured Steele that he might 
"safely rely on the country for forage, meat, and partial supplies of com meal." 
Sherman stressed speed, and urged Steele to "move toward Shreveport by the most 
direct route with all your force," via Arkadelphia. 4 
Steele wrote to Banks on March 7, that he still needed to protect the polls for the 
upcoming election, but thought he could send men at least as far as Arkadelphia or 
Washington. Steele passed on some tantalizing intelligence on Price's worsening 
situation he had gathered from refugees, spies, and Price's adjutant, who visited an old 
2 OR, vol. 32, pt. 2, 246-7. 
3 Ibid., 448-49. 
4 Ibid., 496-97. 
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friend on Steele's staff, who suggested that Price and others had recently fled to Europe 
via Texas.5 
Steele wrote a letter on the same day to Sherman. Again, Steele had "no doubt" 
that Price had fled to Europe, claiming that he had it on the authority of the wife of one 
of Price's staff officers that the Trans-Mississippi high command was deserting. Steele 
wrote that the Confederates, facing the prospect of opposing Banks, would give up 
without a fight and melt into Texas. Sadly, Steele wrote, he would be unable to send 
men to Louisiana and Texas himself, but he was grateful that someone was helping clear 
the region of Confederates. In a P.S., Steele mentioned the Davidson imbroglio, 
claiming that Davidson was "blown up by his own bombshell."6 
On March 10, Steele wrote a trio of letters, to Banks, Grant, and Sherman, in 
which he stressed that he had few troops to spare, and that they were mistaken "in regard 
to the situation of affairs in my department." His men, furthermore, would not be 
necessary to defeat the Confederates on the Red River. To Shennan, he mentioned 
logistical difficulties for the first time. "The country between here and the Red River 
has been nearly exhausted of supplies by both armies, and it will be very difficult to 
obtain forage and impossible to subsist even 7000 troops." As Steele had previously 
sent only small scouting parties to Arkadelphia, it is unclear how "both armies" could 
have stripped the region clean. 7 
Steele wrote to Halleck on the twelfth. He announced that he had resigned 
himself to the Shreveport plan, "against my own judgment and that of the best-informed 
5 Ibid., 518-19. 
6 Ibid., 522-23. 
7 Ibid., 542, 546-47. 
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people here." He planned to move by the most direct route: to Arkadelphia, and thence 
to Washington and Shreveport. He wrote that Sherman suggested he go through 
Camden, but this was impractical; no such suggestion from Sherman, however, is found 
in the record. Indeed, Sherman suggested that Steele get to Shreveport as quickly and 
directly as possible. According to Steele, Banks wanted him to move via Monroe, but 
again Banks was silent on the subject; Steele, however, had suggested Monroe himself 
on the fifth. Steele warned that if he were to leave Little Rock that, given Confederate 
activity in Arkansas, he would likely have to retreat back to Little Rock at any moment 
to protect the northern part of the state. In another letter to Halleck, he warned that 
General Blunt was again causing trouble in Fort Smith, "undoubtedly ... to interfere 
with my contemplated movements." Steele attacked all his sources of outside 
interference and preemptively blamed them for any failure that was to come from the 
expedition, while promoting his own inside knowledge of Arkansas affairs. He thus 
tried to wash his hands of the entire expedition. 8 
Five days later, the plan for the Red River Campaign had changed again. Steele 
wrote Grant, informing him that he now planned to go to Camden after all, and thence to 
Shreveport. He would receive supplies at Camden from Pine Bluff. Steele also 
bemoaned the sad state of his cavalry, which Davidson had previously reported to the 
Joint Committee earlier and had blamed on Steele's mismanagement. Steele avoided 
discussing the precise cause of his cavalry's troubles, but claimed it was another reason 
his expedition faced enormous odds.9 
8 Ibid., 576. 
9 Ibid., 646. 
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On March 23, just before departing on campaign, Steele gave instructions to 
Brigadier General Nathan Kimball, who would command in Little Rock in Steele's 
absence. By now, Steele was again unsure which path he would take. "If we go to 
Camden," Steele wrote, he would try to establish communications with Pine Bluff for 
supplies [emphasis added]. He also urged Kimball to continue Steele's "kind and 
conciliatory course" towards the civilian population. In the meantime, Steele had made 
no plans for regular resupply by wagon trains from either Little Rock or Pine Bluff; 
instead, he would call for supplies as he felt the situation demanded. Later, this lack of 
planning would lead to delays in getting supplies, as both posts were unprepared to send 
them on short notice. IO 
Steele's vacillations, and the contradictions in his letters, make it difficult to 
discern his actual intentions as he prepared to set out from Little Rock. He had little 
desire to conduct an extended campaign. He cited reports that Price had fled to Europe 
and that Confederate soldiers were deserting in droves to argue that the Red River 
Campaign did not need his support. On the other hand, he claimed that the Confederates 
were so strong that leaving Little Rock risked a major attack in his rear. Steele's 
contradictory arguments suggest that his greatest concern was with his own authority, 
and policy, in Arkansas, which he feared would be threatened if he left his post in Little 
Rock. 
IO Ibid., 704. 
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TO CAMDEN AND BACK 
Despite its commander's misgivings, the expedition marched south out of Little 
Rock on the morning of March 23. Steele left Little Rock with approximately 7-8000 
men, in two divisions, one of infantry and one of cavalry, and three artillery batteries. 
Brigadier generals Frederick Salomon and Eugene A. Carr led the two divisions. 
Thayer, with a division from his District of the Frontier, set out from Fort Smith with 
two infantry and one cavalry brigade, approximately 4000 men. Opposing them was 
Sterling Price, commanding five cavalry brigades stretched across southwestern 
Arkansas. Price, with Marmaduke and two cavalry brigades, was at Camden. 1 
Unlike those of the Little Rock Campaign, the precise marching orders for the 
campaign have survived only in part. Steele did, however, issue orders to his officers 
and men concerning supplies, in General Field Orders No. 1: 
The proposed Expedition is through a country scant of supplies. The troops 
composing the Command will undoubtedly have hardships to encounter, which 
the Commanding General doubts not they will cheerfully endure for expected 
results. The country must yield all it can of food and forage, without bringing 
starvation to the people. This fact will not, however, justify plundering or 
indiscriminate seizure of anything. Commanders of Divisions will avail 
themselves of every opportunity to supply their commands, but always under 
lawful direction and accountability. Straggling on the march will be punished 
with severity.2 
This order illustrates most of Steele's chief concerns throughout the entire 
expedition. First, he was certain that supplies would be few and far between, 
necessitating forage. Pursuant to his conciliatory policy, Steele expected his men to be 
ever aware of the civilian population and its needs; he would not countenance a "hard 
1 A map of the theater of the expedition, along with the Union order of battle, can be 
found in the Appendix, 80-82. 
2 Department of Arkansas, General Field Orders No. 1, March 21 1864, Steele Papers. 
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war" even in the face of what he felt would be severe hardship for his men. The 
soldiers' record in obeying these strictures against foraging was, to put it mildly, spotty. 
Despite being often exhorted to travel light, both Steele and Thayer struggled 
with their mobility, largely because of their extensive wagon trains. The expedition 
planners' perception that this part of Arkansas was stripped nearly bare, and the 
experience of the Little Rock campaign the previous year, influenced the size of the 
trains. On that earlier campaign, with relatively little opposition and excellent roads, the 
supply trains did not prove to be an encumbrance; when the time came to leave again, 
Steele appeared to have attempted the same approach to trains and logistics. Sherman, 
in his letters to Steele, consistently emphasized the necessity of rapid movement, and 
would later suggest that having too many wagons, and hence moving too slowly, caused 
part of Steele's difficulties during the campaign. 3 
Detem1ining precisely how many men can be supplied by any particular stretch 
of ground is difficult. An army required a considerable amount of food for its horses 
and men. A force of approximately 12,000, the size of Steele's VII Corps once it united, 
required something on the order of fifty tons a day of food and forage for all its men and 
animals, assuming full rations. Steele's and Thayer's men, before joining up, would 
have demanded around thirty-four and sixteen tons, respectively. One recent attempt to 
calculate how many men could live off the country concluded that "it appears from the 
history of the [Civil War] that armies of less than 10-15,000 [i.e., the size of Steele's 
column] could live by foraging in most sections of the South almost indefinitely." 
Steele also brought along ten portable grain mills to help process forage. How much 
3 OR, vol. 34, pt. 3, 479. 
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com these mills could process is unknown; it is not even known if they were of a 
standard type. Fifty mills, again of unknown specifications, had been provided to 
Curtis's Army of the Frontier in southwest Missouri in 1862; it is possible ten of these 
had made their way to Little Rock and thence to Camden.4 
The Federals were up before dawn on the twenty-third, and were on the road by 
10:00 A.M., "with rations packed, knapsacks slung, forty rounds of ammunition in the 
cartridge-boxes ... to the old, accustomed tune of Yankee Doodle." The first day's 
march was relatively short, approximately nine miles to Fourche Creek, "a small stream 
of beautiful and clean water," of which the men took full advantage.5 
The next day's march set off with a brass band,6 and covered sixteen miles to a 
point on the Saline River, near the town of Benton. Franklin Denny, of the 1st Missouri 
Cavalry, described the area as "generally a very poor farming country, soil very sanding . 
[sic] and Stony." That night, Robert McMahan of the 25th Independent Ohio Light 
Artillery "had a pretty good supper of fresh pork, boiled beef, hot coffee and hard 
bread." The 33 rd Iowa drew rations, which, for the duration of the march, General 
Salomon informed them would be half-rations, except for coffee. 7 
The next day, the twenty-fifth, Salomon added to Steele's General Orders on 
foraging in a Field Order of his own to his division. It was another attempt to constrain 
unauthorized foraging: 
Brigade commanders will detail daily from their respective commands a 
foraging party, to be charged with the special duty of collecting food and forage 
4/bid., series 3, vol. 2, 801; Moore, 72. 
5 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 70; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 222. 
6 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 71. 
7 Ibid., 71; Franklin Denny diary, March 24, 1864, Western Historical Manuscripts 
Collection, University of Missouri at Rolla; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 222. 
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for its own brigade in quantity sufficient for the day. Beef will be brought to 
camp on the hoof and there slaughtered. 
Receipts will be given, if the owners are present, specifying the amount 
and kind of property taken, and reasonable supplies left on the place for family 
use. All property thus taken will be turned over to brigade quartermasters for 
issue ... 
Any soldier having in his possession any property, no matter of what 
description, not legitimately obtained, will be deemed guilty of disobedience of 
orders and punished accordingly. 8 
No diary or letter has yet been uncovered describing any soldier being punished 
for disobeying this order, although there are several descriptions of the crime being 
committed. 
On the twenty-fifth Steele's expedition moved about eight miles to "a good camp 
where is plenty ofrails and here and there a porker." Franklin Denny wrote that that 
night "our men started out a forageing for the first time since we left Little Rock. they 
came to camp loaded with fodder for there horses, besides the bacon hams, chickens, 
turkeys, eggs, &c. which they brought us for there own use." It seems likely that, in 
many of these cases, soldiers merely ignored orders to bring the fruits of foraging to the 
quartermasters for redistribution. This successful foraging, it should be noted, took 
place in a partially depopulated area. Denny wrote of the region: "We passed several 
farms on the road today. one half of them deserted and the other half you see no on 
except a few women and raged Children, thare has been a good deal of cotton raised 
here in years past, almost evry plantation has a cotton gin and press. "9 
For some men, however, the rations were already beginning to come up short. 
John S. Morgan, of the 33rd Iowa Infantry, recorded in his diary on the twenty-fifth that 
he was issued rations for the next two days: half-rations of hardtack, salt, and pork, 
8 OR, vol. 34, pt. 2, 729. 
9 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 222; Denny diary, March 25, 1864. 
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along with a full ration of coffee. Reduced rations, naturally enough, tended to 
encourage foraging, authorized and unauthorized. 10 
On the twenty-sixth, the expedition reached the town of Rockport. The 1st 
Missouri Cavalry continued its good run of foraging. Denny noted: 
our men getting a little short and also a little tired of Army rations, they scattered 
· out in squads through the town and country to look after forage they was soon 
returning some with Sacks of flour, Some with Sacks of the very best bacon 
hams, while others brought in Sugar, Molasses coffe[ e], Salt, Butter Honey, 
chicken turkeys, eggs, in fact almost every thing of the eatable kind we fared 
Sumptuously for one night on rebel expense 11 
On the twenty-seventh, General Carr felt it necessary to reiterate the orders 
against unauthorized foraging. "All serviceable horses and mules and all good beef-
cattle that [foraging-parties] can find" were to be processed through the correct channels 
so that the proper receipts may be issued to the proper owners. The more legalistic of 
Denny's comrades in the 1st Missouri Cavalry may have noted that none of the previous 
night's bounty-eggs, poultry, molasses, etc-were listed in Carr's order. At any rate, 
Denny reported that that night the "men improved the opportunity by bringing in all the 
forage they could get hold of. the men and horses lived well." 12 
Robert McMahan reported that, by the twenty-seventh, "our infantry have 6 
secesh prisoners along." 13 There were indeed three groups other than the troops along 
on the expedition, but they appear only occasionally in the historical record: Sutlers, 
Confederate prisoners, and escaped slaves who attached themselves to the column as it 
10 John S. Morgan diary, March 25, 1864, State Historical Society oflowa; for a 
discussion and justification of the practice of foraging off the countryside, see Sperry, 
33d Iowa, 73. 
11 Denny diary, March 26, 1864. 
12 OR, vol. 34, pt. 2, 752-3; Denny diary, March 27, 1864. 
13 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 223. 
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moved through Arkansas. The latter two represented a drain on supplies, and Steele 
appears not to have factored either of them into his plans. The exact numbers of these 
"camp followers" of various descriptions is unknown; if they were particularly 
numerous, presumably they would have been mentioned more often, but to say more 
would be pure conjecture. They do, however, serv'e to remind us that Steele had more 
than his own soldiers to feed. 
On the twenty-eighth, short rations, and foraging, continued. The foraging, 
however, was becoming more hazardous. John Morgan wrote that, on the twenty-
eighth, there was "no wood-no water-no supper-found some dry branch-soon had 
coffee .. .. I went to bed while Billy cooked a couple of chickens that flew into our 
hands today. As 3 men were skinning a beef they had killed a man stepped out from the 
brush and shot on them. They shot at him and he will never more sho[ o ]t another 
yankee." 14 
On the twenty-ninth, the column finally reached Arkadelphia. As it was one of 
the larger towns in the region, the surrounding area was more thickly settled than what 
VII Corps had been marching through for the previous six days. A. F. Sperry wrote : 
About three miles from Arkadelphia, we suddenly came to a place, where 
all the trees, and the brush and grass looked much fresher and greener than any 
where else. The change was as great and noticeable as though the season had 
been moved a month forward, while we marched a mile. It had almost the 
appearance of magic. We never saw a similar appearance elsewhere, and could 
never account for this. 15 
This region was clearly more lush and prosperous than what they had marched 
through previously. The farms and plantations, too, were bigger. John Morgan "could 
14 Morgan diary, March 28, 1864. 
15 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 75-6. 
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see Mr. Justis' plantation 1 mile above the ford-it appears like a larger town than either 
Benton or Rockport-A very fine brick planter's house, a good steam sawmill, and a 
long row of good negro-quarters." When they reached the town, men started "seeing the 
sights and searching for eatables." Eatables were not hard to find; as always, how they 
were obtained was a matter of some dispute. Sperry wrote that "there was little, if any 
foraging done. We paid for nearly all we got .... A considerable amount of good ham, 
com-meal and molasses was obtained." John Morgan, however, reported that he saw 
soldiers looting smokehouses; for his part, he and his men sought out food in a 
somewhat more rational way, by going house-to-house. "About the 20th house we 
visited found they had something left-they gave us a nice loaf of light bread, all the 
meal we wanted and would take no pay." 16 Even this, of course, violated the orders that 
all forage be brought in and distributed centrally. 
This first stage of the march, from Little Rock to Arkadelphia, demonstrated the 
great weakness of Steele's logistical planning. The formal supply system, rations 
carried the wagons, showed signs of strain almost immediately. The VII Corps had little 
hardtack, and the quartermasters had to cut rations almost immediately. Foraging had 
become a necessity. 
Steele and his command attempted to establish a system of foraging that would 
protect the civilian population, provide sufficient food for the expedition, and prevent 
straggling. The idea was to send out dedicated forage parties, give money or at least 
receipts for what was taken, and distribute what was captured from the central 
subsistence officers outward. Nevertheless, unauthorized foraging remained extensive. 
16 Morgan diary, March 29, 1864; Sperry, 33d Iowa, 76. 
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In fact, the diarists and letter-writers made little mention of "formal" foraging. Why 
bother with a bureaucracy when chickens fly into your hands? 
While not overabundant, most soldiers reported that the food brought in by 
whatever means was sufficient to their needs. Food could be drawn from the country, 
despite the early season and cold weather. However, Captain Charles A. Henry, the 
chief quartermaster for the expedition, described the region as "almost entirely destitute" 
and Lietenant Colonel Adolph Dengler of the 43 rd Illinois described the road to 
Arkadelphia as consisting of "sterile lands and deserted farms," although Arkadelphia 
itself was much better off. The observations of officers and men, then, began to diverge 
early on in the campaign. 17 
While the men in the ranks may not have paid much attention to the formal rules 
of foraging, they did recognize, if not necessarily always observe, a certain code of their 
own. There was a line, however fuzzy, between looting and more proper food 
collection. Paying for food was the ideal, but soldiers generally accepted that a certain 
amount of stealing from the countryside was inevitable. John Morgan was displeased at 
the looting of the Arkadelphia smokehouses, though he never explained what precisely 
made this morally different from capturing livestock. Typically, taking food or fodder, 
with or without a receipt, was acceptable to most soldiers, while physical property 
destruction was beyond the pale. 
The column remained in Arkadelphia for a couple of days, during which one 
incident of this kind of looting occurred. "Led on by the very demon of mischief," A. F. 
Sperry wrote, some soldiers fell upon the Arkadelphia Female Institute, looting and 
17 OR, vol. 34, pt. 1,679, 731. 
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wrecking the building and its contents, seemingly leaving nothing unbroken. The 
culprits were never captured. To prevent further brigandage, Steele placed guards at 
other private residences and buildings in town. 18 
On the thirty-first, Steele's men spent what would be their last full day in 
Arkadelphia. There were rumors that the Confederates were due to attack that day, but 
no attack ever came. McMahan reported that they drew four days' rations, which 
amounted to eleven pieces of hardtack. 19 The army would continue to wait for the 
column from Fort Smith. 
Steele had intended Arkadelphia to be the staging point where Thayer's Frontier 
Division would join him, at the end of March or on April 1. Thayer, however, was 
having his own difficulties. For most of March, he had been concerned with Blunt's 
assault on his authority in Fort Smith. On March 17, Colonel Francis H. Manter, 
Steele's chief of staff, informed him that Thayer and his men were to join the 
expedition. Manter asked Thayer when he thought he could be on the march, and with 
how many troops. Manter added that Thayer's column should be "in light marching 
order, with the smallest amount of rations possible, depending upon the country for meat 
and corn meal. "20 
Thayer wrote back the next day. He had 2600 infantry, 1200 cavalry, and 
fourteen guns to spare, which he felt he could have ready to move in five to six days. 
"We have now five days' rations on hand," he wrote, and was working to bring in more 
18 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 77; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 225. 
19 Ibid. 
20 OR, vol. 34, pt. 2, 638. 
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from Leonora and the surrounding countryside. Manter wrote back that Thayer had to 
move in three days, on the twenty-first, when Steele himself intended to move.21 
As it happened, both Steele and Thayer faced delays. On the twenty-third, 
Thayer wrote to Manter to explain what had happened. "I have had innumerable 
obstacles and difficulties to overcome for want of means to move," he wrote. 
Your dispatch directed me to move on Monday, the 21 st. The same night ... I 
sent to the outposts to call them in. Detachments were out 40 and 50 miles for 
forage, in some instances 60 miles from here. I have done all that human energy 
can do, both night and day, to put the command in motion. Night before last 60 
of the Fourteenth Kansas Cavalry deserted and went, it is supposed, to Fort Scott. 
I had ordered that regiment [to join the column to Arkadelphia], and on Monday 
night the desertion took place, and part of the regiment went in pursuit. This is 
one of the unforeseen difficulties. 22 
He had other problems besides desertion, which he described in two other 
dispatches to Manter. In the first, he advised Manter that he would not be able to take 
the direct route to Arkadelphia, as the area was "entirely destitute of forage for 80 
miles," and instead chose a road that was "somewhat circuitous, but is the only route I 
could get com." In the final dispatch, he gave more details: "It is 170 miles to 
Arkadelphia from here, according to the most reliable information. I mean to be at 
Arkadelphia before the I st of April. Have that drink ready .... I will be troubled for 
forage; that is, I will have to go off the road a great deal to get com." At the rate of 
march he proposed, Thayer would have certainly earned that drink, along with the rest of 
his command. He wrote that on the twenty-third, and if he expected to have reached 
21 Ibid., 647-648. 
22 Ibid., 706. 
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Arkadelphia by the thirty-first, he would have had to march his men at a rate of over 
twenty miles a day-a feat worthy of Stonewall Jackson's "Foot Cavalry."23 
Apparently neither Steele nor anyone in his command questioned Thayer's rate 
of march, and they confidently expected him to appear on schedule. On April 4, 
Brigadier General Nathan Kimball, commanding in Little Rock while Steele was on the 
expedition, wrote a progress report to Sherman. Kimball wrote that he understood that 
Thayer would be in Arkadelphia by the twenty-ninth, a rate of twenty-seven miles a day, 
but that he had not yet arrived or sent an updated itinerary. 24 
Thayer's march was, indeed, far slower than anticipated. Private Hemy Strong 
of the lih Kansas Infantry wrote a vivid account of the march and its preparations in his 
diary. On the twenty-first, after the foraging parties returned, Strong received orders 
that he would march in the morning. "I went out in town this evening," he wrote, "to 
call on a 'young Arkansas Lady' as a preliminary to leaving Fort Smith." As it 
happened, Strong's unit did not move out on the twenty-second, although the 1 gth Iowa 
did; his regiment would catch up over the next few days. On the twenty-third, the 12th 
Kansas did march, and made it six miles, and the next day another eight miles. After 
this slow start, the pace began to pick up, and the column moved twelve miles on the 
twenty-fifth and sixteen on the twenty-sixth. Thereafter the march became more 
difficult. The roads had gone from dusty to muddy, and the grade was increasing. The 
country he was marching through, which was poor and difficult, did not impress Strong. 
He wrote, "I can't see anything that would entice me to leave a civilized and white 
man's country to dwell in this wilderness among the rocks and hills where even the sun 
23 Ibid., 707. 
24 OR, vol. 34, pt. 3, 39. 
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fails to shine more than eight hours in twenty-four." This was rougher foraging country 
than Steele encountered. 25 
The climb continued as the column struggled through the mountains. They were 
making excellent time, considering the terrain; typically twelve miles a day, but far 
below a pace that would bring them to Arkadelphia by April 1. The march was 
-
exhausting. On the thirty-first, Strong "had to carry blankets to the top [of the Fourche 
Mountains] four miles. I thought it a hard way of serving my country .... Got twelve 
miles. Am tired nearly to death."26 
On April 1, Thayer's column had not yet reached Hot Springs, let alone 
Arkadelphia. With the Frontier Division nowhere to be seen, and not heard from, Steele 
had to make his first important decision on the campaign: whether to wait in 
Arkadelphia, or to continue his march. HisJogistic situation suggested that he should 
move. While supplies and forage had held in Arkadelphia so far, foragers would 
eventually deplete the surrounding area entirely. On the other hand, marching would 
further separate his forces, and risk one wing or the other being cut off by Price and the 
Confederates. Up to that point, the Confederates had not been particularly active, but 
like the supplies around Arkadelphia, this could not be expected to last. 
Having decided to move, the next question was where. Steele decided to march 
to Camden, intending to draw supplies there from supply trains from Pine Bluff and 
Little Rock. Captain Junius B. Wheeler, the chief engineer, wrote in his report that 
Steele and the high command considered several routes from Arkadelphia to Camden. 
25 Henry A. Strong, "A Rough Introduction to This Sunny Land": The Civil War Diary 
of Private Henry A. Strong, Co. K, Twelfth Kansas Infantry (Little Rock: Butler Center 
for Arkansas Studies, 2006), 32-33 
26 Ibid., 35. 
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The command rejected three; the first, crossing the river twice and marching along the 
eastern bank of the Ouachita, "from plain military motives"; another, along the west 
bank, was considered impassible to the supply trains, and the third, the most-traveled 
road in peacetime, was defended by Marmaduke and the Confederates.27 
Steele thus decided on a fourth route. He would march from Arkadelphia 
towards Washington, the capital of Confederate Arkansas after the capture of Little 
Rock, to try to mislead the enemy into thinking Washington was his next target. After a 
brief feint, however, he would tum due south towards Elkins' Ferry, and move on 
Camden from there. 28 
The troops arose before dawn on April 1, and set off at six A.M. They marched 
approximately twelve miles to a tiny hamlet known under several names, but most 
commonly as Spoonville. The relatively rich land they first encountered around 
Arkadelphia continued; McMahan wrote that he "passed several large plantations 
today," but that "many of the farmers have protection papers from Steele." Attempts to 
restrict unauthorized looting became more serious, it would seem, when the army was in 
camp in Arkadelphia. McMahan also noted that "negroes are flocking to us fast since 
we left [Little Rock]," adding to the VII Corps' logistical needs.29 
The march south continued the next day. Charles Musser, of the 29th Iowa, was 
part of the rear guard. He wrote of the "immens train of wagons along, which is a great 
encumbrance to an army." April 2 marked the first significant action of the campaign, 
as Marmaduke attacked the column's flank and rear. Steele's men repulsed the 
27 OR, vol. 34, pt. 3, 78; vol. 34, pt. 1, 673. 
28 OR, vol. 34, pt. 1, 673. 
29 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 226. 
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Confederates; Musser claimed that the rebels lost over two hundred men and seventy 
horses, while Price reported merely "little loss." At any rate, the trains and column 
continued unscathed and camped on the Little Missouri River that evening. 30 
The column marched but six miles on the third, through further skirmishing. On 
the fourth, Steele reached Elkins' Ferry, and fought another sharp skirmish against 
Marmaduke. The Federals remained there the next day, and on the sixth marched 
another six miles, and camped just south of the ferry until the tenth. On the ninth, 
Thayer's Frontier Division had finally caught up with Steele's column. 
For the Frontier Division, the march of the last nine days had been quite like that 
of the previous week: hard going, over rough country. The troops began to lighten their 
load with almost every mile. The process began already in March. On the twenty-
eighth, Private Strong recorded that they eliminated much of the baggage in an effort to 
move faster: "All the troops ordered to destroy part of the tents and blankets and 
clothing .... It seems a great pity that so much has to be destroyed, but teams cannot 
haul all. We started with baggage enough to supply three times as many men. It takes 
some time for a fellow to learn anything." The education continued as the men 
continued moving; by early April, they were obliged to march with knapsacks, which 
was a blow. "Six months ago we would not believe that we would be obliged to carry 
on our backs all our baggage or leave it behind," Strong wrote on the first. On the third, 
he finally began carrying his own pack, which he himself nearly burned but decided that 
the knapsack would make it easier to carry his blanket. 31 
30 Musser, Soldier Boy, 116.; OR, vol. 34, pt. 1, 780. 
31 Strong, Rough Introduction, 34-5. 
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The Frontier Division shed more and more gear as it hastened to join Steele. On 
April 5, just past Hot Springs, Private Strong reported that the column's supplies "have 
failed and we have to subsist off the country." Strong, unlike many of Steele's men, did 
not report much unauthorized forage, but instead described organized forage details. 
Forage was sufficient for the needs of the men; the rapid march, however, was especially 
hard on the mules. Strong wrote, "mules are giving out every day," and were abandoned 
when they weakened and could go no farther. The Frontier Division marched ever 
onward, however, as it had to catch up with Steele, who was himself on the move. 
Strong wrote that when his unit met the rest of the column on the ninth, after Steele had 
halted near Elkins' Ford, "Gen Steele's command welcomed us _with cheers." Sperry of 
the 33 rd Iowa, however, wrote that the appearance of the Frontier Division did not 
inspire confidence. "A nondescript style of re-inforcement it was too, numbering almost 
every kind of soldiers, including Indians, and accompanied by multitudinous vehicles, of 
all descriptions, which had been picked up along the road. General Steele toned down 
this extra transportation a good deal before we started again." Indeed, despite Strong's 
insistence that the trains were cut down again and again, they had to be reduced yet 
further; Captain Henry confirmed in his report after the expedition that Thayer still had 
over three hundred wagons, many of which were destroyed at this point. 32 
With his command finally together, Steele was able to press on to Camden 
without further delay. First, however, the expedition had to cross the Prairie D' Ane, a 
broad, treeless expanse near Washington, where the Confederates blocked their path. 
The Battle of Prairie D 'Ane would last for parts of three days, from the tenth of April 
32 Strong, Rough Introduction, 36-8; Sperry, 33d Iowa, 79; OR, vol. 34, pt. 1, 679. 
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through the twelfth. Two brigades under General Price opposed the expedition. The 
heaviest fighting came on the first day, as the two armies first joined. That night the 
men ate their hardtack in the field, but the next morning many were able to take a better 
meal, as "details of men were sent back to the wagons, to make coffee at fires kindled 
behind some thickets, which hid them from rebel view. The more fastidious had their 
pork fried, and some went so far as to stew up crackers in grease and water, as a luxury; 
but the majority of the line had to take their 'hard-tack and sow-belly' in a raw state, and 
be thankful to have their coffee warm." After the second day's desultory skirmishing, 
Price abandoned his fortified position and pulled back. 33 
Price had built a fortified line near Washington, intending to lure the Federals 
into them.34 By now, Steele, however, had no intention of advancing to Washington or 
Shreveport, but moved on Camden according to the plan he adopted in Arkadelphia. 
The VII Corps reached Camden by the fifteenth, through often rough and swampy 
terrain. Even among the swamps and forests of the region, however, the men were still 
able to find forage. 
Sperry reported a renewed effort to enforce the restrictions on foraging after the 
battle at Prairie D' Ane. As was often the case, the orders were spottily enforced, and 
Sperry wrote that the officers of his regiment tended to turn a blind eye. He wrote that 
men were able to bring in "sugar, pork, chickens, pigs, &c." Corporal McMahan wrote 
that a forage train was sent ahead of the column as well, which doubtless brought in 
some of the same kinds of food. This first mention of a forage train indicates that the 
33 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 83-84. 
34 OR, vol. 34, pt. 1, 780. 
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quartermasters paired increased attempts to bring in regular forage with their attempts to 
reduce unauthorized foraging. 35 
On the fourteenth, the march through the swamps and forests over bad roads 
continued. Private Strong wrote that there was "no chance to make up for deficiency [in 
rations] by foraging from the Rebels, as the troops ahead take all". Being behind the 
bow of the wave was hard, especially as the rear guard, which included Private Strong, 
could be as much as fifteen miles behind the front. Soldiers closer to the front fared 
much better, such McMahan's artillery unit, which came upon and claimed a large 
supply of beans in an abandoned farmhouse. It was, of course, this very situation that 
organized, deliberate foraging was designed to prevent; food collected and redistributed 
by higher-level authorities could, at least in theory, spread the food more equitably. 
Regulations, however, tended to be powerless against the means, motive, and 
opportunity of the troops on the march. 36 
On April 15 and 16, the army made its way into Camden. Foraging opportunities 
were plenty. Sperry wrote that the cavalry rode into town "rich with the forage of a 
country where no Union troops had ever been before," and soon after arriving in camp 
his own infantry began to spread out in search of forage of its own. They found "many a 
ham and pound of sugar, and pone of com-bread, in most cases bought at a very small 
expenditure of legal tender." McMahan wrote that, in another show of controlling the 
foragers, "patrols are catching up all our boys caught Jayhawking or without passes."37 
35 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 84; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 232. 
36 Strong, Rough Introduction, 40; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 233. 
37 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 88-9; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 234. 
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Camden was far and away the largest city the Federals had reached on the 
expedition, with a prewar population of2219 (smaller only than Little Rock, with a 
population of 3727), and thus the civilian population provided a tempting target.38 One 
resident and major landowner, Judge John Brown, wrote extensively about his . 
experiences in his diary. He called the fifteenth "THAT AWFUL DAY OF ALL DAYS," 
and reported that the first wave of Federal troops through the town captured a significant 
amount of his stores. "The soldiers," he wrote, "dashed to our doors demanding food-I 
soon handed out all the victuals which were on hand, cooked--after dark they broke into 
the smoke house and commenced carrying off as they wanted. My bacon was soon 
taken except for a few pieces which I saved by packing it into the house. Fortunately I 
had hid some 200 lbs . which escaped. In the course of the night most of the contents of 
the store room was taken-say 2 bbls. flour-a lot of hand soap--neat a bbL of sugar-
and various smaller articles besides the meat." Shortly, however, Steele restored order. 
Three "subordinate officers" ate dinner with Judge Brown, and assured him that by the 
next day he would have little trouble from Union soldiers.39 
Such proved to be the case. Brown wrote, on the sixteenth, that his part of the 
city was under control by noon, "by means of patroles in the streets and special guards 
to citizens." Not all the city could be protected equally, particularly the outlying areas, 
but forage was slowly being bent to an official army policy. The seventeenth saw great 
success from a forage party, bringing in "several squads of cattle" with much else. The 
38 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 1860: Classified Population of the States and 
Territories by Counties: Arkansas: Population of Cities and Towns. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1864. 
39 Judge John William Brown diary, April 15, 1864, Arkansas Historical Commission, 
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greatest prize came that day when the Confederate steamship Homer was captured some 
distance downriver from Camden, and with it thousands of bushels of com, and, 
according to McMahan, two barrels of whiskey.40 
Steele's quartermaster reported that the Homer held 3000 bushels of com. 
Assuming that this was parched kernels, the normal way to store corn and ship it long-
distance, this represented somewhere between 75 and 85 tons. If entirely turned into 
cornmeal, and thence to cornbread, this could produce upwards of 120 tons of 
cornbread. This translates to 80,000 full daily rations; at least a week's worth of food; 
two weeks' at half-rations. This, combined with the food brought in from foraging, and 
later supplies from Pine Bluff, meant that provisions at Camden were not at critical 
levels .. 41 
Once he saw Camden, Steele began to warm to it. He wrote to Halleck on the 
seventeenth that "strategically and commercially, I regard [Camden] as the first town in 
Arkansas. The Washita [sic] is navigable always for several months in the year to this 
place, and sometimes to Arkadelphia .... With a gun-boat as a convoy we can get 
supplies up this river. I expect supplies from Pine Bluff, and will move to Red River as 
soon as possible, but consider it all-important to hold this place."42 
Steele, despite earlier doubts about his ability to hold the Arkansas River line, 
was now proposing to move the line farther south to the Ouachita, between Arkadelphia 
and Camden. Now that he had decided to occupy Camden now indefinitely, Steele now 
had to find a more permanent source of supplies. In his report, cited above, he was 
40 John Brown diary, April 16, 1864; McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 234. 
41 Charles Fox, The American Text Book of Practical and Scientific Agriculture . .. 
(Detroit: Elwood and Company, 1854), 112-121. 
42 OR, vol. 34, pt. 1, 661-2. 
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expecting regular trains from Pine Bluff, and steamers from the Mississippi up the 
Ouachita. In the meantime, foraging parties continued to head out from Camden. A 
nearby mill was commandeered and placed under the control of the 36th Iowa, which 
"was kept running at all hours of the day and night," and supplementing that were the 
ten portable mills, operated by four-man teams, carried in the wagon train.43 
On April 17, a forage train set out from Camden toward Poison Spring, which 
had been a campsite for the column earlier. Elements of the 1st Kansas Colored Infantry 
regiment, some cavalry and two guns, 695 men in all, escorted the train of 198 wagons. 
They foraged through the night, and headed back on the morning of the eighteenth, 
"loaded with corn." They met a reinforcement of 465 men and two more guns; 
however, due to straggling and fatigue, no more than 1000 men were effective. 
Confederates attacked the forage train shortly after the reinforcements arrived, and took 
three hundred casualties, plus all the wagons, to little Confederate loss. That night, 
reports began to stream in to Camden of atrocities committed against the African 
American soldiers of the 1st Kansas; some were scalped by Choctaw Confederate 
cavalrymen, others were shot by white Confederates. The literature on the Poison 
Spring atrocities exceeds that of the rest of the campaign combined, and will not be 
summarized here.44 The effect on morale was tremendous, however, and revenge would 
inspire the Federals, black and white, in later engagements. Henry Strong, and the 12th 
Kansas Infantry, beat drums all night on the eighteenth to guide in stragglers and the 
43 Ibid., pt. 3, 196. 
44 One excellent book is Mark K. Christ, ed., "All Cut to Pieces and Gone to Hell" : The 
Civil War, Race Relations, and the Battle of Poison Spring (Little Rock: August House, 
2003). 
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wounded; he wrote "They killed after our boys surrendered the wounded that had been 
put in ambulances. If this is true no punishment is too great for them."45 
As notable and gruesome as the Poison Spring episode was, it represented but 
one supply train; on the twentieth, another arrived safely bearing ten days' rations. 
These 175 wagons came from Pine Bluff, and were escorted by a scant 400 men.46 The 
light forage and supply train escorts drew much commentary; neither Steele nor anyone 
else ever explained why much larger forces were not sent out. On the twenty-first, 
Strong and his unit escorted another forage train. "We went out about ten miles and 
loaded the Brigade train with com and all the grub we could find, and got back just at 
dark. Got a good deal of meat and some potatoes. The Rebs tried to get their Cavalry 
between us and town and capture us. They nearly effected it, too, as they were only 
three miles away when we got back into the road. But we all got back safe." Steele 
reduced the regimental allowance of wagons in order to spread out the losses from 
Poison Spring, and ordered the divisional commanders to cut back their headquarters 
baggage to "as little as absolute necessity may require." Furthermore, "all horses and 
mules captured ... will be at once turned over to the quartermaster" in order to supply 
animals to the quartermaster corps and the cavalry.47 Strong also noted the orders to 
reduce the size of the supply trains, and alsoreported the rumor in camp that General 
Banks had been soundly defeated on the Red River. "If so," Strong wrote, "we will not 
stay in this country long, but the rumor is not credited."48 
45 OR, vol. 34, pt. 1, 743-6; Musser, Soldier Boy, 123; Strong, Rough Introduction, 41. 
46 McMah~n, Reluctant Cannoneer, 235. 
47 OR, vol. 34, pt. 3, 245. 
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As it happened, the rumors of the Red River Campaign's failure were accurate. 
On April 9, Banks suffered a major defeat at the battle of Mansfield, which precipitated 
his retreat down the Red River. On April 15, after more skirmishes and battles and 
retreats, Banks wrote to Steele to report that "the enemy is in larger force than was 
anticipated by the Government," and asked that Steele move at once to join Banks and 
sweep the Confederates before them. Steele chose not to; at this point in the campaign, 
joining Banks would have been the military equivalent of throwing good money after 
bad. Despite the Confederates having turned back the Red River Campaign, Steele's 
primary goal remained to defend his new outpost at Camden against the invigorated 
Confederates, who were due to be reinforced at any moment by veterans from the Red 
River. Camden, the "first town in Arkansas," was too rich a prize to give up.49 
Throughout, foraging (of various kinds) continued in town, if in a more 
controlled fashion than when the troops first arrived. Judge Brown wrote on the 
twentieth that soldiers were coming by and taking his cotton, paying for it with Federal 
government receipts, which he would not accept, believing these IOUs unlikely to ever 
be paid. 50 This is the only report of the Union army seizing cotton. How prevalent this 
practice was is unknown; it does not seem to have hindered the movement of the Federal 
army, and also was not one of Steele's stated priorities. Private Strong reported that 
there was a great deal of sugar and molasses in town, to which "the soldiers helped 
themselves pretty freely." 51 
49 Ibid., pt. 1, 668; pt. 3; pt. 3, 161. 
50 Judge Brown diary, April 20, 1864. 
51 Strong, Rough Introduction, 43. 
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On April 23, the supply train that had arrived on the twentieth turned back to 
Pine Bluff for more supplies with an escort from Camden. That evening, a Union 
outpost south of Camden was attacked, but it turned back the Confederates with little 
loss to either side. As it happened, this was a diversion to keep Steele from reinforcing 
the supply train heading back to Pine Bluff, which Confederates attacked and captured 
in the battle ofMarks's Mills on the twenty-fifth.52 
When news reached Steele of this latest setback, he called an immediate council 
of war to determine the next move. He wrote in his report that he "could have held 
[Camden] against Kirby Smith's entire force" if they had been able to maintain their 
supply line; now, with the road to Pine Bluff being very tenuously held, the time had 
come to leave. Steele had heard of the disaster five days previously, and had it 
confirmed two days later. These were days he would want back as the retreat began. 
The men, thanks in part to the camp rumor mill, had already begun to prepare for 
moving on short notice. On the twenty-fifth, the 33 rd Iowa had "a strange feeling ... 
· that 'some thing was going to happen."' The men began to prepare to leave on the 
twenty-sixth. Captain Henry, the chief Quartermaster, was ordered "to destroy such 
wagons and stores as could not be removed for lack of animals," nearly ninety wagons 
and an unknown amount of other equipment. Sperry wrote that among the destroyed 
stores were food supplies: "box after box of crackers were burned, which could have 
been better distributed to the soldiers." No other source reported food destruction, but 
rations were short for the march home. The supply train of the twentieth had brought in 
ten days' rations; by the twenty-sixth, the men would likely have consumed more than 
52 OR, vol. 34, pt. 1, 668. 
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half of these. Private Strong wrote that his unit got "five hard tack to the man, also a 
little bacon and coffee." In the 33 rd Iowa, rations appear to have been distributed 
unevenly among the companies; between luck and initiative, some soldiers would fare 
better than others. "Some men," Sperry wrote, "drew but just two qackers, with a small 
amount of meal, some meat, and coffee, for the full supply that was to last them till we 
reached Little Rock; and many had not more than two crackers and a half-pint of meal. 
A few were fortunate enough to get their meal baked up into com-cakes at houses near, 
before we started, but the rest had to cook it themselves, as best they might, along the 
road." One soldier who had com meal baked up before leaving Camden was John 
Morgan, who had a half-bushel cooked for him in town, a service he paid for with two 
and a half pounds of coffee. Besides his com cakes, he and four comrades took with 
them ten hardtacks, nine pounds of ham, coffee, and some sugar. 53 
The road back would not be a desert, just as the road down had not been; 
however, it was rougher going and the speed of march militated against the kind of 
foraging the army had previously conducted. Several factors dictated the speed of the 
retreat. First, getting back to Little Rock was a priority, and this encouraged the men to 
move as quickly as possible. During the retreat, however, it began to rain heavily, and 
many of the roads turned to mud. Since there were still well over two hundred wagons 
in the column, the men had to wrench the wagons out of the mud at regular intervals. 
Furthermore, according to McMahan the column also had "twenty to thirty 
families" along with them, presumably either slaves escaping to Union-occupied 
Arkansas and freedom, or Arkansas unionists. The retreat seemed to be especially hard 
53 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 94-95; OR, vol. 34, pt. l, 680; Strong, Rough Introduction, 43; John 
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on them; what support, if any, they received from the Army was not recorded. During 
the retreat, they seem to have largely fended for themselves, and kept up with the march 
as best they could. Sperry wrote of two incidents involving them during the retreat. In 
the first, a wagon containing "a half-dozen negro babies, of assorted sizes," was left in a 
muddy ditch, still hitched to a mule that had drowned in the mud. The second, a bit of 
hearsay that Sperry reported "as was told by many who witnessed the incident," 
involved a mother who cast her baby by the side of the road "as a soldier would his 
knapsack." Sperry had no idea what became of the child, and imagined that there were 
several such children abandoned on the march. 54 
On April 28, the army reached the town of Princeton. Virginia Davis Gray, a 
Princeton resident, wrote of the army's behavior. "They denied that they were 
retreating, but owned up to the loss of the train [at Marks's Mills]. They came and kept 
coming-the infantry was like hungry wolves-they followed the directions given to 
Peter, "Stay and eat." In less than one hour, great old bristly hogs was killed-cooked 
an eaten- ditto of cows scusing the bristles." Enough remained, however, to feed the 
Confederates as they passed through the next day. 55 
"Every night since leaving Camden," Sperry wrote of the 33rd Iowa's 
experiences, "we had camped in a com-field," but the exigencies of the march meant 
that the crops of the area provided little sustenance. The area around Princeton 
"reminded us all of Iowa," suggesting an area of considerable foraging opportunities in 
54 McMahan, Reluctant Cannoneer, 238; Sperry, 33d Iowa, 109. 
55 Virginia Davis Gray, "Life in Confederate Arkansas: The Diary of Virginia Davis 
Gray," Carl Moneyhon, ed., Arkansas Historical Quarterly 42 (Summer 1983), 82. 
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less hectic circumstances. As it was, food, aside from the liberated pigs and cows 
accumulated at Princeton, meant government rations, which were now dwindling 
rapidly. 56 
On the thirtieth, Steele and his men having just crossed the Saline River, the 
largest battle of the entire campaign took place at Jenkins Ferry. Despite having made a 
forced march through rough country, and consuming short rations, the Federals dealt the 
Confederate army, now under the control of General Edmund Kirby Smith, a severe 
blow, and knocked them off the trail, which bought VII Corps enough time to reach 
Little Rock. 
The last few days proved to be by far the most difficult of the campaign, despite 
being out of combat. On the morning of May 1, the column was about fifty miles from 
Little Rock; marching hard every day, they reached "The Rock," and safety, by noon on 
the third. Private Strong and the rest of the Frontier Division, bringing up the rear, fared 
badly. Strong's government rations had actually given out just before the battle of 
Jenkins Ferry, and his unit ate foraged grain. A. F. Sperry wrote that by May 1 and 2, 
the food situation had finally become a problem. He wrote that the men "had been 
hungry for some time, but now began to actually suffer for lack of food." The 
distinction between hunger, and suffering from hunger, is telling; while the situation had 
been far from ideal for some time, the VII Corps was still able to march long distances 
over difficult terrain, and defeat the enemy in battle. By the morning of the May 2, 
Sperry wrote that those soldiers who had managed to conserve their rations were able to 
demand a high price for them; one got two dollars for a single hardtack; another 
56 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 97; Strong, Rough Introduction, 44. 
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received a silver watch for two of the normally shunned and scorned pieces of hard 
bread. John Eckroate wrote that he was out of hardtack for one day, presumably the first 
or second, but wrote, rather coyly, that he "had plenty of meat so I did not starve."57 
This situation did not last for very long. On the evening of the second, a supply 
train coming from Little Rock arrived in camp and distributed rations to the troops, who 
accepted them eagerly. The crisis, which lasted over parts of two days at the tail end of 
the retreat, had passed. These periods of acute food shortage, while obviously 
unpleasant and best avoided, were common to all the armies during the war, even the 
superbly-provisioned Army of the Potomac, which operated far closer to railheads and 
major depots than did Steele's VII Corps. That great chronicler of life in the Army of 
the Potomac, John Billings, discussed the phenomenon. "I have been asked a great 
many times," he wrote, "whether I always got enough to eat in the army, and have 
surprised inquirers by answering in the affirmative. Now, some old soldier may say who 
sees my reply, 'Well, you were lucky. I didn' t.' But I should at once ask him to tell me 
for how long a time his regiment was without food of some kind . . .. And I should be 
very much surprised if he should say more than twenty-four or thirty hours, at the 
outside."58 Such shortages, then, were common experiences of soldiers in the Union 
army, rather than only encountered on marches through parched territory. 
The last few miles to Little Rock passed without incident. Just before entering 
the city, the column paused to reform its lines and march in with heads high and in the 
best military order they could muster under the circumstances. They had marched out of 
57 Strong, Rough Introduction, 46; Sperry, 33d Iowa, 112; John Eckroate, May 7, 1864 
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Little Rock weeks before to music and flags, but this time, wrote Sperry, "the fifes and 
drums had been so nearly used up on the campaign, the pounding was hardly as lively as 
usual."59
59 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 113. 
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"MISMANAGEMENT, BLUNDERING, OR ALL INTENTIONAL" 
Back in camp, surrounded by a bustling Army-driven economy and a major 
supply depot, the men took advantage of finally being able to eat as much as they 
pleased, and in greater variety than before, and particularly the past week. Eating, 
sleeping, and reading mail occupied the men for the next few days. 1 Another popular 
activity was critiquing the campaign, and its commander. 
The grumbling was loud, and sustained. Charles Musser of the 29th Iowa wrote 
just after Jenkins Ferry that "Steele is hated by all. even the Secesh here call him a fool. 
Blunder after blunder was commited. our trains being taken was a blunder of his or it 
was intentional. I would rather believe the latter. he is an old villain and a whiskey 
bloat and not fit to command a flatboat." When he returned to Little Rock, he continued 
to vent. "Once more in our old camp at Little Rock and hartily glad we are here and not 
in the field where we can be sold by our own General. I hope he will be superseded 
Soon by a man. ... [It was] all mismanagement, blundering, or all intentional."2 
The grumbling reached as far as Pine Bluff, where James Lockney of the 28th 
Wisconsin recorded that the men there, too, blamed the loss at Marks's Mills on Steele's 
"carelessness or treachery," and mentioned that one of the variants on the treachery 
theme was that Steele's sister was married to an important Confederate, either General 
Fagan or an unnamed Major, and lived near Camden. The idea, then, was that the 
expedition was a grand scheme to bring off a minor family reunion. 3 These rumors were 
all patently false, but had remarkable staying power. Long after the war, Captain 
1 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 113. 
2 Musser, Soldier Boy, 125. 
3 James Browne Lockney Diary, April 28, 1864, James Browne Lockney Papers, 
Wisconsin Historical Society. 
68 
Edward Ruegger of the 9th Wisconsin had "promoted" Steele's sister to being the wife of 
General Kirby Smith, in an entertaining but entirely preposterous published 
reminiscence of the campaign.4 
Some saw the debacle as a chance to attack Steele's politics. "Scout," writing in 
the St. Louis Missouri Democrat, blamed Steele ' s Conciliatory Policy and poor fighting 
spirit for the defeat. "Scout" felt that Steele was well-placed to make real gains in 
Arkansas. "Having possession of Camden," he wrote, "it would appear that a strenuous 
effort should have been made to hold it. The country was full of forage and com." The 
correspondent had a solution that Steele would have dreaded. "It would not be a bad 
move to try a Blunt policy," he wrote, referring to General Blunt, the interloper in Fort 
Smith.5 
Colonel Engelmann, commanding a brigade at Camden, tried to put the best face 
on the expedition. In a magnificent phrase, he wrote to his wife, "while it was a retreat, 
it was a victorious one."6 To be sure, common soldiers sometimes recast the campaign 
in light of their performance at Jenkins Ferry and their fortitude shown on the forced 
march back to Little Rock. Sperry wrote that soldiers should look back with pride on 
Camden for its "examples of stem and determined endurance, of desperate courage 
successfully resisting the force of overwhelming numbers, of faithful attempts to obey 
orders, and cheerful fortitude in braving disaster." 7 
4 Edward Ruegger, "Five Weeks of My Army Life," Wisconsin Historical Society. 
5 
"From Southern Arkansas," Missouri Democrat (St. Louis), 10 May 1864. 
6 Adolph Engelmann, May 4 letter (to Mina), Engelmann-Kircher Family Papers, 
Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, Ill. 
7 Sperry, 33d Iowa, 113. 
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The fact remains, however, that the campaign was a disaster. The objective of the 
expedition was to reach Shreveport and cooperate with Banks's Red River campaign. In 
this, it failed utterly. How much of this failure can be attributed to Steele? Most recent 
historians, once again led by Ludwell Johnson, absolve Steele. If the campaign was 
doomed from the beginning, they argue, Grant, and the rest of the Union national high 
command, deserve censure, and Steele bears responsibility only for minor tactical 
decisions. 
This conclusion rests on a pair of misconceptions. First, Steele deserves more 
responsibility for the planning and course of the campaign than historians give him. The 
distance between Steele and the eastern command meant that Steele had to be given 
latitude in where and how his corps marched. Furthennore, Steele seized this power for 
himself, through his continual protests about how he was the only one who understood 
his situation. When he set out, only he had any idea where he was going- if he even 
knew himself. 
Given Steele's longstanding and oft-expressed opposition to the campaign, it is 
worth asking whether Steele, in the end, really intended to ever get to Shreveport. 
Obviously Steele had no reason to court a humiliating disaster, but at the same time he 
wanted to avoid committing himself. If Banks's move up the Red River drew out Price 
and the other Arkansas Confederate forces, then Steele could safely follow them as 
planned. On the other hand, staying in Arkansas and awaiting developments allowed 
Steele to observe Banks, and Price, as long as possible. Steele's concern for Arkansas, 
or at least for the survival of his position and policies, was apparently quite genuine. 
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There is no reason to doubt that he felt threatened by Blunt and Price, and that leaving 
Arkansas might have given both his enemies free rein. 
Because of Steele's concerns, and slow march through southwest Arkansas, it 
seems reasonable to believe that Steele had little intention of moving directly on 
Shreveport as he was ordered to do. Rather, he conceived of his movement as 
essentially a probe, designed to buy Steele time, lend assistance to Banks at a distance, 
show the flag in southern Arkansas, and possibly inflict some damage on Confederate 
forces there. 
When Steele occupied Camden, however, his priorities changed. Camden was 
the "first town in Arkansas," and Steele suddenly determined to hold the Ouachita 
between Camden and Arkadelphia. This was nowhere in the plans, and Steele was 
forced to adopt an ad-hoc supply line to Pine Bluff. It was when this line failed, at 
Marks's Mills, that Steele finally decided to retreat. This was the supply crisis that 
compelled Steele to retreat, not a "desert" between Little Rock and Shreveport. 
Steele escaped heavy criticism thanks in large part to the spectacular failure of 
Banks on the Red River. Compared to that catastrophe, Steele's failings appeared 
minimal. To be on the safe side, however, Steele sent his aide, Manter, to Washington 
to act as a lobbyist on his behalf. Manter was highly effective, meeting with Lincoln, 
Halleck, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, and others to discuss the campaign, and who 
should be blamed for its failure . Banks was the unanimous choice. 8 
In the Red River campaign, neither Banks nor Steele could have brought victory 
alone. The failure of either column meant the likely demise of the entire operation. It 
8 F. H. Manter to Frederick Steele, May 13, 1864, Steele Papers. 
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would have been prudent, indeed, for Steele to retreat from Camden immediately upon 
hearing of Banks' s defeat; his desire to hold Camden, however, kept him in camp until it 
was almost too late. If Steele had moved faster, he may well have reached Shreveport, 
but well ahead of Banks, and Steele may have been more exposed than he was at 
Camden. 
The Camden Expedition had little impact on the wider war. It weakened Steele's 
position, and likely helped Price's raid escape Arkansas later in 1864, but that raid was 
crushed in several battles, notably at Mine Creek. This expedition is important not for 
its impact, but what it reveals about how occupation and military policy interacted 
during the Civil War. Steele's conciliatory occupation policy set in motion a long chain 
of events that affected the nature of the Camden expedition. It brought Steele numerous 
enemies, and complicated his tasks enormously. It encouraged him to tread very lightly 
on campaign, restricting his foraging policy. All his troubles engendered a distrust of 
outsiders who might meddle in his affairs, and challenge his supremacy in Arkansas. 
When it came time to march out of Little Rock, he was so unwilling to abandon 
Arkansas that he sacrificed his role in the larger Red River campaign. Politics and 
logistics shaped Steele's campaigns in Arkansas, revealing some of the problems of 
occupation and command in the Trans-Mississippi. 
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Figure 1: The Area of the Little Rock Campaign 
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Table 1: Union Order of Battle for the Little Rock Campaign 
Major General Frederick Steele, Commanding 
Escort: 
3rd Illinois Cavalry 
Kane County (IL) Cavalry 
First (Cavalry) Division 
. Brigadier John W. Davidson, Commanding 
First Brigade (Colonel Washington F. Geiger) 
2nd Missouri Cavalry 
7th Missouri Cavalry 
8th Missouri Cavalry 
Second Brigade (Colonel John M. Glover) 
10th Illinois Cavalry 
1st Iowa Cavalry 
3rd Missouri Cavalry 
Reserve Brigade (Colonel John F. Ritter) 
13th Illinois Cavalry 
3rd Iowa Cavalry 
32nd Iowa Infantry 
1st Missouri Cavalry 
Artillery (Captain Julius L. Hadley) 
Second Division 
2nd Missouri Light Artillery (Bty. K) 
2nd Missouri Light Artillery (Bty. M) 
25th Ohio Battery 
Colonel William E. Mclean, Commanding 
First Brigade (Colonel William H. Graves) 
18th Illinois Infantry 
43rd Illinois Infantry 
54th Illinois Infantry 
61 st Illinois Infantry 
106th Illinois Infantry 
12th Michigan Infantry 
Second Brigade (Colonel Oliver Wood) 
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Table I Continued: Union Order of Battle for the Little Rock Campaign 
126th Illinois Infantry 
Third Division 
40th Iowa Infantry 
3rd Minnesota Infantry 
22nd Ohio Infantry 
27th Wisconsin Infantry 
Brigadier General Samuel A. Rice, Commanding 
First Brigade (Colonel Charles W. Kettredge) 
43rd Indiana Infantry 
36th Iowa Infantry 
77th Ohio Infantry 
Second Brigade (Colonel Thomas H. Benton, Jr.) 
29th Iowa Infantry 
33rd Iowa Infantry 
28th Wisconsin Infantry 
Other forces with Steele: 
Cavalry Brigade (Colonel Powell Clayton) 
1st Indiana Cavalry 
5th Kansas Cavalry 
Artillery (Captain Mortimer M. Hayden) 
3rd Iowa Battery 
1st Missouri Light Artillery (Bty. K) 
5th Ohio Battery 
11th Ohio Battery 
True's Brigade (Colonel James M. True) 
(Arrived at the end of the campaign) 
49th Illinois Infantry 
62nd Illinois Infantry 
50th Indiana Infantry 
27th Iowa Infantry 
Vaughn's (Illinois) Battery 
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Table 2: Union Order of Battle for the Camden Expedition 
Major General Frederick Steele, Commanding 
Headquarters Units: 
3rd Illinois Cavalry, Coy. D 
15th Illinois Cavalry, Coy. H 
Third Division 
Brigadier General Frederick Salomon, Commanding 
First Brigade (Brigadier General Samuel A. Rice) 
5 0th Indiana Infantry 
29th Iowa Infantry 
33rd Iowa Infantry 
9th Wisconsin Infantry 
Second Brigade (Colonel William E. McLean) 
43rd Indiana Infantry 
38th Iowa Infantry 
77th Ohio Infantry 
Third Brigade (Colonel Adolph Engelmann) 
43rd Illinois Infantry 
40th Iowa Infantry 
27th Wisconsin Infantry 
Artillery (Captain Gustave Stange) 
2nd Missouri Light (Bty. E) 
Vaughn's (Illinois) Battery 
Wisconsin Battery 
Frontier Division (From Fort Smith) 
Brigadier General John M. Thayer, Commanding 
First Brigade (Colonel John Edwards) 
1st Arkansas Infantry 
2nd Arkansas Infantry ( eight companies) 
18th Iowa Infantry 
2nd Indiana Battery 
Second Brigade (Colonel Charles W. Adams) 
1st Kansas Infantry (Colored) 
2nd Kansas Infantry (Colored) 
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Table 2 Continued: Union Order of Battle for the Camden Expedition 
12th Kansas Infantry 
1st Arkansas Battery 
Third (Cavalry) Brigade 
Cavalry Division 
2nd Kansas Cavalry 
6th Kansas Cavalry 
14th Kansas Cavalry 
Brigadier General Eugene A. Carr, Commanding 
First Brigade (Colonel John F. Ritter) 
3rd Arkansas Cavalry (four companies) 
13th Illinois Cavalry, Coy. B 
3rd Iowa Cavalry (detachment) 
1st Missouri Cavalry (eight companies) 
2nd Missouri Cavalry 
Third Brigade (Colonel Daniel Anderson) 
10th Illinois Cavalry 
1st Iowa Cavalry 
3rd Missouri Cavalry 
Forces at Pine Bluff, under Colonel Powell Clayton 
18th Illinois Infantry 
1st Kansas Cavalry (eight companies) 
5th Kansas Cavalry (ten companies) 
7th Missouri Cavalry 
28th Wisconsin Infantry 
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